UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
May 2017

The Relationship Between Mood and Implicit Learning
Kathleen Larson
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons

Repository Citation
Larson, Kathleen, "The Relationship Between Mood and Implicit Learning" (2017). UNLV Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 3003.
http://dx.doi.org/10.34917/10985984

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons
license in the record and/or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and
Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOOD AND IMPLICIT LEARNING

By

Kathleen G. Larson
Bachelor of Arts – Psychology
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
2011
Master of Arts – Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2014

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy – Psychology

Department of Psychology
College of Liberal Arts
The Graduate College

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 2017

Copyright 2017 by Kathleen G. Larson
All Rights Reserved

Dissertation Approval
The Graduate College
The University of Nevada, Las Vegas

March 31, 2017

This dissertation prepared by

Kathleen Larson

entitled

The Relationship Between Mood and Implicit Learning

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy – Psychology
Department of Psychology

David Copeland, Ph.D.

Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D.

Examination Committee Chair

Graduate College Interim Dean

Mark Ashcraft, Ph.D.
Examination Committee Member

Stephen Benning, Ph.D.
Examination Committee Member

Richard Warren, Ph.D.
Examination Committee Member

Courtney Coughenour, Ph.D.
Graduate College Faculty Representative

ii

ABSTRACT
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOOD AND IMPLICIT LEARNING
By
Kathleen G. Larson
Dr. David E. Copeland, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This dissertation investigates whether a person’s current mood state influences their ability to
learn implicitly. Implicit learning refers to learning about regularities in the environment without
having conscious access to the information (e.g., Reber, 1967). According to the affect-asinformation hypothesis, a positive mood increases global processing of incoming information
and negative mood leads to local processing (e.g., Clore & Storbeck, 2006); however, most
previous studies that investigated mood and cognition have focused on more explicit types of
learning and decision making, but few have examined implicit processes. Thus, the current
experiments examined how varying levels of mood and arousal affect artificial grammar
learning. A pilot experiment demonstrated an advantage for positive mood when the images were
mood inducing. Experiment 1 had a separate mood induction phase and participants completed
an artificial grammar task that contained letters. These results replicated an earlier study by Pretz
et al. (2010) that showed an advantage for those in a negative mood. Experiment 2 was an
expansion of the pilot by including standardized images and two additional mood groups
(positive-high arousal and neutral). However, there were no significant differences between
mood conditions. Experiment 3 used categories of pictures and found a disadvantage for those in
a positive / high aroused state. While the patterns across the experiments were slightly different,
altogether, the results were not consistent with the predictions made by the affect-as-information
hypothesis. As addressed in the dissertation, this could be due to certain elements of the artificial
iii

grammar learning procedure, such as the long viewing phase diminishing the mood and arousal
induction effects. The dissertation also considers other possibilities, including the idea that
implicit learning is not as affected by mood as explicit learning.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There are many skills that people learn that they cannot always verbalize. For example,
imagine a pair of police detectives were assigned to monitor the activities of a potential criminal.
The detectives may learn the daily routines of the adversary after countless hours of surveillance.
They may not be able to explicitly describe all of the suspect’s patterns of behaviors, but they
would likely notice if there is an anomaly. This dissertation explored implicit learning, where
people pick up on consistent patterns without necessarily being able to describe them. In
addition, this dissertation also considered how mood interacts with this process. One possibility
is that a good mood will boost the ability to detect regularities due to broadening of attention that
is known to accompany a positive mood (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Another possibility is
that a negative mood will increase the ability to detect anomalies due to narrowing the focus of
attention (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). I will begin by discussing the construct of implicit
learning, the techniques used to study it, and some of the main findings in the literature. I will
then discuss mood and how it affects cognitive processes, followed by the small number of
studies that have examined the influence of mood on implicit learning.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Implicit Learning
Overview of Implicit Learning
Implicit learning occurs when people automatically learn information about the relations
of events or objects without intending to do so, and the knowledge is difficult to express
(Cleeremans, Destrebecquz, & Boyer, 1998). The procedure typically involves incidental
exposure to rule governed stimuli (unbeknownst to the participant), a test to measure what
participants learned, and a measure of how conscious the knowledge is that was acquired (e.g.,
Reber, 1967). Learning is referred to as implicit because even though people are not actively
trying to encode the information for later retrieval, there is evidence that information was
remembered to some degree; for example, in these tasks, participants usually score above chance
on the test despite having little confidence in their performance.
The term implicit learning was first dubbed by Reber (1967) in his seminal study. Reber
thought that traditional learning tasks employed in a laboratory setting did not mimic how
children learn their native language. He examined language acquisition by testing adults with an
artificial grammar that they had never been exposed to before. The grammar was generated by a
finite-state grammar (Chomsky & Miller, 1958). This is a process where transitions from one
state to another state produces a letter and is typically illustrated with a state diagram (see Figure
1). In these early experiments, grammatical strings (consisting of 3-8 letters) were presented on
notecards during the learning phase. Importantly, participants were not told that the strings
consisted of any pattern; they were simply told that the experiment was investigating memory.
2

After learning, the participants were then informed that the strings of letters were derived from a
‘rigorous’ set of rules. They then had to complete an unexpected yes / no recognition test where
they decided whether the strings presented during test were grammatical. The results showed that
people were able to classify the strings significantly above chance, meaning that participants
were learning at least some of the rules underlying the grammar, despite not being able to state
the rules in post-experimental questioning. This method has been employed in several
experiments since (for reviews see Pothos, 2007; Reber, 1989; Shanks & St. John, 1994) and it
now referred to as the Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) paradigm (Reber, 1967).
Interestingly, in the late 1990’s developmental researchers coined the term statistical
learning to account for a very similar phenomenon. Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996) had 8month old infants listen to an artificial language where there were no pauses between words but
the syllables occurred in specific temporal orders. For example, infants were presented with an
audio stream such as “bidakupadotigolabubidaku” and based on the consistently repeating
patterns, bidaku would be considered a “word” (note: the stimuli were audio - underlining was
used here to emphasize that particular pattern for the reader). The infants listened to the language
for two minutes. Then they were tested with words (e.g., bidaku) and part words (e.g., bupado);
the infants looked longer at the novel words (i.e., part words), indicating that they had learned
the grouping of syllables that was presented during the listening phase. The results were coined
as statistical learning because learners could “compute” a statistic of how often the syllables
occurred in relation to each other.
Statistical learning has been referred to as a type of implicit learning because learners are
usually not conscious of the pattern (e.g., Aslin & Newport, 2012). There are several similarities
between the statistical learning procedure and the artificial grammar paradigm. For instance, they
3

both require incidental learning of structured material that is followed by a test. However, there
are some notable differences; specifically, for statistical learning: (1) participants are given a
cover task (e.g., responding when there is a duplicate stimulus), (2) the stimuli are presented to
them in one continuous stream, and (3) the recognition task is forced-choice (instead of yes / no).
Despite statistical learning paradigms and artificial grammar paradigms originating from
different traditions, there are now several cross-references between the two domains (see
Perruchet & Pacton, 2006, for a review) and some use the term implicit statistical learning to
refer to both domains (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2006).
Other Paradigms
Although the artificial grammar paradigm and the procedures used to examine statistical
learning dominate the literature, there are two other paradigms worth mentioning. Sequence
learning is a type of implicit learning that is typically measured with a Serial Reaction Time
(SRT) task, where participants press a key when they see a stimulus appear in various places on
the computer screen (e.g., Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). For example, the screen could be divided
into a quadrant and the participant presses one of the four corresponding keys each time that a
star appears. The participants are not aware that the presentation of stimuli is following a pattern,
but because of the pattern, they end up making faster responses than participants who are
assigned random sequences. Therefore, participants are able to predict the next event based on
past events. The underlying pattern is usually generated from a finite-state grammar like those
used in the artificial grammar paradigm. An advantage of the Serial Reaction Time task over
other techniques is that there is no separation between the study phase and the test phase,
presumably making it more like implicit learning in the real world.
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Dynamic System Control is used less frequently than the other paradigms and began in
the problem-solving domain. In Dynamic System Control tasks, participants are trained to
control the computer simulation of an interactive system, such as a sugar factory (Berry &
Broadbent, 1984). The participants are given certain output variables, such as the amount that the
sugar factory produces, and have to manipulate certain inputs, such as the number of workers in
the sugar factory. They are given a specific goal (e.g., amount of sugar) to reach and maintain.
This task is considered implicit because participants can typically reach the goal level of control,
even though they cannot explicitly state the rules of the system when asked about them in a postexperiment questionnaire. Furthermore, making participants aware of the underlying rules
improves their ability to answer questions about the system but not their ability to control it
(Berry & Broadbent, 1984).
Implicit Learning and Decisions in Everyday Life
Implicit learning is important to study because it is believed to be the foundation of
intuitive decision making (Patterson et al, 2013). There are two types of decision processes that
drive the decisions that people make: (a) analytic decision making and (b) intuitive decision
making (Evans, 2008). Analytic decision making is when people make decisions in a slow and
deliberate manner. For example, when someone puts a considerable amount of effort into
deciding where they are going to attend graduate school, they may spend a great deal of time
explicitly weighing the pros and cons of different choices. In contrast, intuitive decision making
occurs when people make decisions in an automatic and procedural fashion. For example, a
person’s morning routine and grocery shopping involve processes that are highly automatic and
typically do not involve much conscious thought. Intuitive decisions are made more than analytic
decisions in order to function in everyday life.
5

There is often an advantage to using intuitive decision making over analytic. For
example, Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) studied neonatal nurses and discovered that the
experienced nurses could determine whether the infants had a life threatening infection before
the blood test confirmed it. However, the nurses often had difficultly verbalizing how they
reached their conclusions. Similarly, physicians with a high level of knowledge can use their
intuitions and make better decisions than less knowledgeable physicians (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006).
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) found that highway engineers perform better
when they use a non-analytical approach. These findings of better outcomes for intuitive
decisions have been replicated in several fields, from the military to expert chess players (see
Klein, 1998, for a review).
The studies above support the idea that experts can use unconscious pattern recognition
to help them make quick decisions This theory has been referred to as the Recognition Primed
Decision model and posits that people make decisions, often not at a conscious level, that are
based on cues in their environment that are similar to past experiences (Klein, 1997, 1998, 2008).
In other words, prototypical events get stored in long term memory and the expert is able to
quickly determine if the details of the current event match past events. Therefore, intuitive
decision making is believed to rely on tactical knowledge that is stored in procedural memory
and therefore harder to articulate (Klein, 1998). For example, a firefighter draws on past
experiences to make assessments about how dangerous the fire is based on cues like heat and
height of flame. Research suggests that eighty percent of the time, experts make intuitive
decisions instead of analytic decisions. Experts are also more likely to spend a greater amount of
time analyzing the situation as opposed to deciding a course of action compared to novices
(Kobus, Proctor, Bank, & Holste, 2000).
6

It is important to note that not all experts can make decisions based on regularities
because not all professions operate in a predictable environment. For example, stock brokers,
clinical psychologists, and college admissions officers have less regularity in their jobs than
firefighters, accountants, and livestock judges (Shantea, 1992). A profession like firefighting
operates in an environment that has been termed “high validity” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009)
because there are salient cues followed by stable events. In contrast, in a “low validity”
environment, decisions are not as practiced and people often never receive feedback about their
outcomes.
Due to human error in low validity environments, some have argued that statistical
prediction (also termed mechanical judgments) derived from algorithms is superior to human
decision making (Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000). However, as Kahneman and
Klein (2009) pointed out in their review, mechanical judgments are superior to human judgments
only in cases where validity is either low (so it is difficult to detect regularities) or very high
(when humans are likely to have attentional lapses in judgments). In the former case, a statistical
approach is more effective because it maintains consistency even when the cues are weak
(Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) because humans are more likely to find idiosyncratic relationships
between variables (e.g., when predicting future stock values).
To summarize, implicit learning is an important process to study because it builds the
foundation for intuitive decision making. In that, the regularities in a person’s environment that
are acquired through implicit processes give people a template to compare to similar situations.
Intuitive decision making is utilized in the real world more than analytic decision making.
Experts in predictable environments rely on non-salient cues to make decisions but other factors
can also influence how people make decisions.
7

Stimuli Without Words
A large number of implicit learning studies have used word stimuli, either presented
visually or aurally, to better understand language acquisition. However, the use of non-word
stimuli can demonstrate how we learn about other regularities in our world, outside of language.
For example, both the artificial grammar paradigm and the statistical learning paradigm have
been altered by replacing the “letters” in the grammar with tones (e.g., Saffran, Johnson, Aslin &
Newport, 1999), images (e.g., Otsuka, Nishiyaman, Nakahara, & Kawaguchi, 2013), and even
vibrations (e.g., Conway and Christiansen, 2005). I will quickly review some of the research
conducted in non-visual sensory modalities, but then focus on the studies that have used visual
stimuli as the current investigation will use images.
Saffran et al. (1999) presented participants with nonlinguistic materials in a statistical
learning paradigm. Specifically, letters were replaced with tones, such as G#DB. Adults who
were non-musicians first listened to the tonal auditory streams and then made discriminations
between tone ‘words’ and tone ‘part- words’ (e.g., ADB). The participants were able to
successful make the discriminations, and remarkably, so were 8-month infants in a subsequent
study. This finding demonstrated that people can implicitly learn non-linguistic auditory
information at a relatively low level but other studies have found that people can implicitly learn
more complex auditory information such as rhythm (e.g., Selchenkova, Jones, & Tillmann,
2014).
Conway and Christiansen (2005) investigated if people could demonstrate tactile implicit
learning and whether performance was comparable to other modalities. They presented vibration
on participants’ fingertips in an artificial grammar sequence where each letter from the grammar
8

was mapped to a specific finger. Participants were able to learn the underlying structure of the
vibrations, although consistent with other findings reported earlier, they were not able to
verbalize the patterns. However, when the same stimulus set was compared to the auditory and
visual domains, stimuli presented tactically produced comparable performance to stimuli
presented visually, though aurally presented stimuli produced the best performance.
In the visual modality, implicit learning has been explored with an immersive real world
environment. Patterson and colleagues (2009, 2013) examined the implicit learning of vehicles
(e.g., cargo truck) in a simulated point-of-view that an Air Force pilot might encounter. The
sequences of vehicles followed a finite state grammar and participants were either told to
memorize or view the vehicles’ sequences. Participants were able to learn the underlying
grammar and the performance was comparable regardless of the instruction condition. However,
when the researchers investigated participants’ ability to transfer to other mediums, they found
that people could transfer the knowledge of sequences from a simulated environment to a flat
screen display but not the other way around. This shows that implicit learning can occur in a
simulated real world environment and that there might be some slight differences between
learning in a virtual environment compared to a static one.
Fiser and Aslin (2002) presented participants with an animation of changing shapes
utilizing a statistical learning paradigm. One shape was presented at a time from behind a vertical
cylinder. Participants were able to learn the underlying pattern as evident by 95% performance
on a forced-choice recognition test and in a subsequent study they were able to also learn the
conditional probabilities (e.g., that the triangle follows the star given that the square appeared).
Learning the conditional probability improved with longer exposure suggesting that simpler
statistics or pattern recognition are learned first.
9

In a study that is particularly relevant to the current investigation, Brady and Oliva (2008)
examined whether people could learn implicitly at a conceptual level. Utilizing a statistical
learning paradigm, they presented images of various complex scenes (e.g., bathroom, bridge, and
bedroom) grouped together in triplets. Participants were very accurate on the recognition test and
were able to overcome how scenes were grouped together in the real world (e.g., of those three,
bathroom and bedroom are usually close in proximity in the real world). In a subsequent
experiment, they used a different picture from the same category each time it was presented (e.g.,
covered bridge, Golden Gate bridge, etc.) and found that participants were fairly accurate,
although not as accurate as when the same pictures were used. They then took it one step further
and tested with only words because many of the pictures from the same category had similar
perceptual features (e.g., pictures of bridges always included water). The participants performed
at the same level of accuracy with the words as they did with the different pictures. The results
from these experiments demonstrate that people can learn implicitly with natural scenes and that
they are not just learning their low level features, but they are also processing the scenes at a
higher conceptual level.
Implicit Learning Theories
Early implicit learning studies attributed implicit learning to the acquired abstract mental
representations of the underlying structure of the material (e.g., Reber, 1967). This was based on
the idea that knowledge in the artificial grammar task is derived from a separate, tacit system,
which is why participants are often not conscious of their learning. Studies demonstrating
transfer when different letters were used between training and test (Altmann, Dienes, & Goode,
1995; Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1969) were provided as evidence for tacit learning.
Moreover, some have suggested that the information acquired through implicit learning is
10

consolidated in procedural memory (Patterson et al., 2013). The main evidence for this claim
comes from a study where amnesic patients were able to learn pattern-analyzing skills despite
showing no explicit memory for the stimuli or task (Cohen & Squire, 1980). Additionally,
making participants aware of the rules before the presentation of the letter strings makes them
perform worse (Reber & Allen, 1978), suggesting that an unconscious encoding might be
required.
Several researchers have suggested that participants in artificial grammar experiments do
not memorize rules but make decisions during the recognition test based on what has been
referred to as ‘exemplars’ that were memorized during the presentation phase (Brooks & Vokey,
1991; Medin & Smith, 1981; Posner & Keele, 1968). Exemplars are derived from experiences
that get stored in episodic memory as a template or schema and form the basis for category
learning (Redher & Hastie, 2004). In artificial grammar paradigms, exemplars are compared to
items presented on a test based on overall resemblance or similarity. In other words, people are
drawing analogies between test items and exemplars that were remembered during training.
A more extreme alternative to the abstract explanation was developed by Perruchet and
Pacteau (1990) who showed that the knowledge acquired in both artificial grammar learning and
statistical learning tasks might consist of little more than explicitly memorized short fragments
such as bigrams (i.e., two letter fragments) or trigrams (i.e., three letter fragments). Then people
decide whether the grammar string presented during test is grammatical or not depending on
whether it contains one of the memorized chunks. For example, a participant could recognize
that the bigram TP occurs frequently and make the decision during testing that TPPTS is
grammatical because it contains that memorized chunk. This explanation derives from the
finding that participants who only studied bigrams performed at the same level as participants
11

who saw the complete letter strings (Dulaney, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau,
1990). Support for this model also comes from studies showing that grammatical test items high
in ‘chunk strength’ (i.e., comprised of common bigram and trigrams) are more likely to be
classified as grammatical (Knowlton & Squire, 1994).
An even more extreme theory reduces artificial grammar learning to mere exposure. The
mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) is based on the finding that people develop a preference for
stimuli that they find more familiar to them. One artificial grammar study (Gordon & Holyoak,
1983) replaced the standard yes / no grammar test with a ‘liking’ test where participants rated
how much they liked letter strings, and, surprisingly, performance was comparable to the
standard test. Another study (Buchner, 1994) examined fluency, a similar psychological
construct, where repeated stimuli are processed more quickly than novel stimuli. It was found
that while people could identify grammatical strings more quickly in a perceptual clarification
task, performance on that task did not predict grammatically judgments later in the yes / no
recognition test. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, transfer can occur in artificial grammar
learning suggesting that implicit learning is not bounded by the superficial features. Therefore,
few researchers endorse the mere exposure effect as an adequate explanation of implicit learning.
Overall, researchers have not been in agreement with regards to the mechanism driving
implicit learning. It could be based on a separate tacit system, a form of category learning, or
based on purely memorized chunks. However, this has not been debated in the literature recently
and some have suggested a hybrid explanation whereby a general tacit system and a more
explicit system based on memorized details is required to be successful at implicit learning (e.g.,
Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 2001; Meulemans & Van Der Linden, 1997).
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Is Attention Needed for Implicit Learning?
On the surface, it would appear that not much attention is required to learn in an implicit
learning task, considering that participants are typically not instructed to pay attention and often
do not realize that they are learning anything. For example, Saffran, Newport, Aslin, Tunick, and
Barrueco (1997) found that both children and adults demonstrated implicit learning with a
statistical learning paradigm for auditory streams that were played in the background while they
were performing an unrelated coloring task. Conway and Christiansen (2006) also used a
statistical learning paradigm and found that people could learn two different sequences
simultaneously if they were presented in two different modalities and performance was
comparable to those that only learned one sequence. These studies have led some researchers to
believe that implicit learning occurs automatically from mere exposure, thus, requiring little
attention (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Saffran et al., 1999).
However, several studies suggest the opposite; namely, that attention is required in
implicit learning because a secondary task impairs performance compared to a single task when
using an artificial grammar or serial reaction time paradigm (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990;
Frensch, Buchner, & Lin, 1994). For instance, Patterson et al. (2013) found that accuracy suffers
when people perform an implicit learning task while simultaneously engaging in articulatory
suppression. The discrepancy between the Saffran et al. (1997) study and other studies possibly
derives from the differences in the paradigms. Specifically, the statistical learning paradigm
requires less attention due to presenting a less complex underlying pattern compared to the
artificial grammar and serial reaction time paradigms. Therefore, it appears that attention helps
people learn information better in an implicit learning task, but full attention may not be
required.
13

Turke-Brown, Junge, and Scholl (2005) investigated this issue further by exploring
whether attention was selective during implicit learning. Employing a statistical learning
paradigm, participants were presented with green and red shapes, and told to only attend to one
of the colors (e.g., “target” and “ignored” shapes). During a later test when the shapes were
presented in black, people demonstrated implicit learning for the “target” shapes, but not the
ones that had been presented earlier in the ignored color. The same pattern of results was found
when the test included the colors that were used during the familiarization phase and when the
colors were swapped (i.e., the green shapes presented during familiarization were red during the
test). However, when the experimenters measured response times of target detection, participants
were able to detect “target” and “ignored” shapes equally well. The results of these experiments
suggest that implicit learning is automatic, but that people are able to direct their attention to
particular aspects of the stimuli to improve learning.
In a later study, Turk-Browne, Isola, Scholl, and Treat (2008) were interested in whether
people attend to the objects (e.g., shapes), features (e.g., color), or both during a task. Over a set
of experiments, the researchers discovered that visual statistical learning can be both objectbased and feature-based. When the shapes were presented in the same color during the
familiarization phase, people showed better performance for objects. However, people did not
show evidence of implicit learning when presented with uniquely colored shapes and then tested
separately with either color patches or colorless shapes. These results indicate that implicit
learning in the visual domain is more object-based but that people can still rely on features as
another cue to identify the object.
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Neural Correlates of Implicit Learning
Even though the experiments conducted and reported for this dissertation do not include
neurological measurements, an understanding of what has been learned from studies that have
focused on the brain can be helpful. Several studies have shown that amnesic patients with
damage to the medial temporal lobe (which includes the hippocampus) show normal
performance on an artificial grammar task (Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994,
1996). However, those patients are only able to perform the same as normal participants when
instructed to make grammatical judgments and not when told to make judgments based on the
training phase. The difference is thought to be due to the latter depending more on explicit
memory processes (which are impaired for the patients due to the temporal / hippocampus
damage).
Additionally, several studies have shown that patients with Huntington’s and Parkinson’s
disease demonstrate normal artificial grammar learning (Knowlton et al., 1996; Reber & Squire,
1999; Witt, Nuhsman, & Deuschl, 2002). In Huntington’s disease, patients have damage to the
basal ganglia (an area believed to be involved with action selection) and with Parkinson’s
disease, patients have damage to the substantia nigra (an area that produces dopamine).
However, they do show impaired performance in the serial reaction time task, as well as other
motor-related tasks (Knopman & Nissen, 1991; Siegert, Taylor, Weatherall, & Abernethy, 2006;
Willingham & Koroshetz, 1993). The findings from these studies suggest that serial reaction
time and artificial grammar learning may rely on different underlying mechanisms and these
findings align with other studies that have found performance differences (e.g., Destrebecqz &
Cleeremans, 2001).
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Brain imagining studies have revealed that a large number of brain circuits are involved
in implicit learning depending on the task. For instance, despite patients with Huntington’s and
Parkinson’s performing normally on artificial grammar tasks, studies with normal participants
have shown activation in the basal ganglia (Forkstam et al., 2006; Lieberman, Chang, Chiao,
Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2004). The prefrontal cortex areas, such as the left inferior gyrus and
Broca’s area, are involved in both the learning and testing phases in the artificial grammar
paradigm (Opitz & Friederici, 2004; Petersson, Folia, & Hagoort, 2012; Skosnik et al., 2002).
Interestingly, similar regions are also involved in language processing (e.g., Karuza et al., 2013).
The way that implicit learning relies on the basal ganglia is complex, in part because the
basal ganglia is a multi-component system consisting of the striatum, caudate, and putamen
(Nolte & Angevine, 1995). The basal ganglia are important for motor functions (e.g., eye
movements; Hikosaka, Takikawa, & Kawagoe, 2000) and are connected to the motor cortex and
premotor cortex (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986). However, they are also connected to the
prefrontal cortex (Middleton & Strick, 1994), making it important for cognitive functions as
well. There are several ways that these systems can interact in implicit tasks with learning taking
place in either the basal ganglia (Pasupathy & Miller, 2005) or the prefrontal cortex first (Fuster,
2001).
Overall, the neurological underpinnings that underlie implicit learning are complex. The
hippocampus is generally associated with explicit long term memory but does not appear to play
a role in implicit learning, as evident by amnesiacs’ normal performance (e.g., Knowlton and
Squire, 1994). The basal ganglia appear to be an important set of structures for implicit learning
(e.g., Forkstam et al., 2006), but reliance on them is not absolutely necessary as those who have
damage to their basal ganglia (e.g., those with Parkinson’s and Huntington’s disease) still
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perform normally on artificial grammar tasks, probably due to the recruitment of another brain
structure such as the prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 2001).
Individual Differences and Implicit Learning
In cognitive psychology, it is common to explore individual differences in cognitive
processes; however, the cognitive processes that are examined are usually more explicit. For
example, individual differences in an explicit task like a working memory span test are related to
performance on other explicit cognitive tasks, such as IQ, problem solving, and comprehension
(Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, 2002). In contrast, numerous
studies have found modest to no correlations between implicit learning and individual
differences in cognitive abilities such as working memory, intelligence, and intentional associate
learning (Gebauer & MacKintosh, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2009; McGeorge, Crawford, & Kelly,
1997; Reber, 1993; Reber, Walken, & Hernstadt, 1991). Some researchers have posited that the
lack of individual differences stem from implicit learning being more of an evolutionarily older
ability and thus should be more resistant to individual differences (Reber, 1993). However,
others have gone as far to say that implicit learning tasks are more dependent on automatic
association processes rather than cognitive abilities (e.g., Mackintosh, 1998), which is in line
with many dual process theories that are considered today (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein,
Pacin, Denes-Raj, & Haier, 1996; Evans, 2003,2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
Despite the lack of correlations between implicit learning task performance and
traditional individual difference variables in cognition (e.g., working memory, IQ, etc.),
relationships have been observed when using nontraditional variables. Specifically, Kaufman et
al. (2010) found that verbal analogical reasoning and foreign language performance
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independently predicted performance on a serial reaction time task in adolescents. This finding
suggests that implicit learning ability might contribute to specific language acquisition skills and
is consistent with findings in the statistical learning literature which have found that higher
performance on statistical learning tasks in children is related to learning the syntax of language
(Kidd, 2012), reading ability (Arcului & Simpson, 2012), and vocabulary growth (Evans et al.,
2009).
It also appears that implicit learning proficiency may be related to certain facets of
personality. One study found that individuals who were categorized as intuitive types on the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Jung, 1971) were better than sensing types at the implicit learning
task of judging applicant personality profiles (Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000). The intuitive types
also reported using more intuitive strategies than the sensing types. The researchers suggested
that perhaps the intuitive types let feelings of familiarity guide their decisions. Kaufman et al.
(2010) also found a relationship between intuitive personality type and implicit learning with a
serial reaction time task. Additionally, performance on the serial reaction time task was also
correlated with the Openness aspect of the Big Five Aspect Scales (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson
2007). Other researchers have also argued that intuition and implicit learning are related
constructs with subjective feelings getting acquired through implicit learning experiences
(Dienes, 2008; Lieberman, 2000; Reber, 1989).
Individual differences arising from differences in culture background have also been
examined. It is well known that Westerners are more focused on individual elements and Asians
focus more on global aspects or the ‘big picture’ (e.g., Nisbett, 2003). Kiyokawa, Dienes,
Tanaka, Yamada, and Crowe (2012) presented grammatical strings consisting of large letters that
was made of a smaller, different letter (e.g., a large N made up of smaller B’s) to Japanese
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(Asian) and United Kingdom (Western) participants. The researchers found that the Japanese
learned only at the global level but the United Kingdom participants learned equally well at both
levels. In a subsequent experiment, when participants were instructed to attend to the global or
local level, the participants from both cultures performed equally.
Overall, it appears that implicit learning is related to other psychological processes that
are relatively implicit, especially those that are related to language learning (e.g., Kaufman et al.,
2010). However, being both open to experiences and more likely to rely on feelings of intuition
are also related to better performance on implicit learning tasks (e.g., Woolhouse & Bayne,
2000). These findings suggest that occupation selection in terms of personality tests and
language learning proficiency may be a useful tool to judge who is going to perform well at tasks
involving implicit processes. A person’s mood might also influence implicit learning. The next
section will discuss how a person’s current emotional state or mood influences how they make
decisions, perceive the world, and what they encode in their memory.
Mood
Overview of Mood
When using the term mood, it is important to note that there are several different, related
terms that can be used and have been used by researchers to describe this phenomenon. Affect is
the term used to refer to the representation of general valence that one experiences and it can be
positive or negative. The representation can be cognitive, physiological, and behavioral, among
others (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Mood is a similar term that refers to a diffuse affective state.
In contrast, emotions are usually seen as related to the appraisal of a single object or stimulus,
shorter in duration, and can be reflected differently depending on the type of emotion being
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expressed (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, & Niv, 2015). While some
researchers have used the term affect (e.g., Isen, 2002), and others have used mood (e.g., Gasper
& Clore, 2002), the terms appear to be relatively synonymous and used interchangeably in the
literature.
There are several ways that mood can be induced in a laboratory setting. For example,
mood state can be manipulated by having participants watch films, recall memories, view
pictures, or listen to music. Additionally, the mood manipulation procedure can be considered
incidental, referring to when the mood state is not related to the cognitive task. It can also be
integral, referring to when the mood state is induced by the cognitive task (e.g., making
judgments about car accident pictures). To my knowledge, there are only a handful of studies
comparing the different mood induction procedures (Albersnagel, 1988; Martin, 1990;
Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hales, 1996). A meta-analysis that examined 11 of the mood
induction procedures found larger effect sizes for film and story (Westermann et al., 1996). The
effects are also larger when participants are explicitly told to enter a mood state, indicating that
participants are possibly succumbing to demand characteristics (Westermann et al., 1996).
When researchers ask participants to self-report mood, the most widely used mood
measure is the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) which consists of 10 positive
mood words (e.g., excited) and 10 negative mood words (e.g., distressed) that participants rate on
a five point Likert scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). It was derived from Zevon and
Tellegen’s (1982) larger mood checklist and has been found to be reliable, valid, and not
influenced by demographic variables (Crawford & Henry, 2004). It is typically administered
before and after the mood induction procedure to see if the induction impacted their baseline
mood state. Because certain cognitive effects, especially in decision making, are reduced if
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participants are aware of the mood manipulation (e.g., Schawrz & Clore, 1983), briefer versions
of the PANAS were explored. For example, a short form of the measure (I-PANAS-SF) was
developed a few years ago and consists of only 5 positive and 5 negative words (Thompson,
2007). The shorter version was found to be a reliable and valid research tool that does not take as
long to administer as the traditional PANAS.
Mood and Cognition
An important reason for discussing the effects of mood is that research has shown that the
mood an individual is experiencing can influence how they learn and process information and
this has been termed the affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Schwarz &
Clore, 1983, 2007). Specifically, a positive mood is believed to elicit relational processing and
involves processing incoming information in relation to concepts in memory and drawing
connections between those related concepts (Fiedler, 2001; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). To put it
simply, a positive mood encourages a broadening of attention and cognitive resources, leading
people to focus on the big picture rather than the details. As a result, a positive mood encourages
the use of schemas (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Suesser, 1994), promotes the solving of insight
problems by increasing transfer (Rowe, Hirsch, & Anderson, 2007), and focuses attention on the
global aspects of stimuli (Gasper & Clore, 2002).
However, drawing these global connections as a result of being in a good mood can be a
disadvantage, depending on the goal of the task. As an example of this, Storbeck and Clore
(2005) induced mood through music and then had participants complete the Deese-RoedigerMcDermott (DRM) paradigm. In this paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants are
presented with a list of related words (e.g., freeze, shiver, arctic) that are missing one highly
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associated word (e.g., cold), which is referred to as the critical lure. If participants incorrectly
recall the critical lure as part of the original list, they are thought to have constructed a false
memory. In the Storbeck and Clore (2005) study, participants in a positive mood were more
likely to recall the critical lures; in other words, these participants, who were in a positive mood,
formed the association between the list of related words and the critical lure, leading them to
mistakenly recall the critical lure. It should be noted, though, that a later study demonstrated this
trend only occurs when the mood induction procedure is performed before participants study the
list of words (Storbeck & Clore, 2011), suggesting that the association made (due to the positive
mood) occurred during encoding (i.e., not retrieval).
In contrast to the research on positive moods, a negative mood can prevent false
memories due to what has been termed item specific processing (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998;
Fiedler, 2001; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). This involves processing the unique features (or details)
of stimuli, rather than considering the stimuli in relation to other concepts. Because those in a
negative mood are less likely to make connections among related concepts, they are less likely to
be susceptible to false memories (Storbeck & Clore, 2005), the influence of scripts (Bless et al.,
1996), and the reliance on stereotypes (Isbell, 2004); in other words, they are making fewer
inferences or connections. In contrast to a positive mood, a negative mood enhances memory for
specific details that are in one’s focus (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007), analytical
thinking (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990), performance on deductive reasoning tasks
(Oaksford, Morris, Graniger, & Williams, 1996) and improves performance on spatial tasks
(Gray, 2001).
Not surprisingly, because mood influences the focus of attention, it also impacts what is
remembered about the stimuli or the event itself. Specifically, a vast amount of research suggests
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that a positive mood increases memory for extrinsic contextual details and a negative mood
increases memory for intrinsic item features (for a review, see Kensinger, 2009). For instance,
studying an image of a car accident (i.e., a stimulus inducing a negative mood) will produce high
accuracy for the accident but not for the surrounding context, such as the street where the
accident occurred (Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). The visual details of
negative items (e.g., snake) are also more likely to be remembered than positive items (e.g.,
cake) (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). The lack of
encoding for details can carry over to stimuli or events presented shortly after, such as a negative
word blocking the memory for the subsequent word (Hurlemann et al., 2005).
While the studies mentioned above used stimuli that can clearly be put in a positive or
negative category, the trends hold up even when the valence of the event is determined by the
perceiver. For example, after a professional baseball game in which the Red Sox beat the
Yankees, the Yankees fans (who were in a negative mood due to their team losing) remembered
event details more accurately (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). Additionally, Germans who did not
support the fall of the Berlin Wall (and, hence, were in more of a negative mood) reported more
accurate details about the event (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007). Similarly, people who disagreed with
the verdict in the O.J. Simpson trial were less likely to “falsely” recognize fictitious events from
the trial; in other words, being in more of a negative mood was related to them being more
accurate (Levine & Bluck, 2004). These findings all support the affect- as-information
hypothesis in real word scenarios, with individuals in a negative mood focusing more on the
details which results in stronger memory of those details to a greater extent than those in a
positive mood.
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Although negative mood draws attention away from contextual details so that attention
can be focused on the mood inducing stimuli, sometimes this memory trade-off can be overcome
when people are given specific encoding instructions. In one study, when young adults were
instructed to remember all aspects of an accident scene (i.e., have a broader focus) they were
able to overcome the usual narrowing of attention that accompanies a negative mood; however, it
should be noted that older adults still had a narrow focus and were unable to remember the
contextual details (Kensinger, Piguet, Krendl, & Corkin, 2005). This finding suggests that it is
possible that people can be trained to have a broadening of attention with some negative stimuli
but that it does require extra cognitive resources, which is why older adults were unable to
overcome the deficit.
It is important to point out that the research reviewed so far focuses on the valence of
mood, or the general state of feeling positive or negative. However, recent research has found
that motivational direction should also be considered (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price,
2013). Motivational direction is the degree to which a particular affective stimulus encourages a
behavior. For example, viewing a cat film is considered low approach while viewing desserts is
considered high approach (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). This is because while most people
find cat films entertaining, it does not encourage them to take any action; in contrast, seeing an
appealing food typically makes people hungry. This motivational direction changes the focus of
attention, making those who watch the dessert film have a narrower focus on a visual processing
task. Furthermore, the attention is narrowed even more when participants are told that they will
be able to consume the desserts after viewing the pictures. Therefore, the usual broadening of
attention does not occur when people are motivated to perform a behavior. Although, this
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dissertation will be focusing on valence, motivational direction will be considered when
choosing stimuli.
Altogether, a body of evidence demonstrates that mood changes how people process and
remember information. Because the studies highlighted above all involve explicit memory,
learning, and problem solving tasks, the question remains whether mood influences implicit
learning. The affect-as-information hypothesis is based on the idea that attention gets altered by
mood, thus influencing learning and memory outcomes. However, as previously reviewed,
attention is tied to better implicit learning performance, but full attention is not required.
Therefore, it is possible that mood may not change how people perform on an implicit learning
task. Also, it is hard to predict whether a global focus or narrow focus would be optimal for
implicit learning performance. In the next section, I review the dimension of arousal, how it
interacts with mood, and how it influences cognition.
Arousal
While the majority of studies, especially in the cognitive realm, have focused on valence
(i.e., general direction of mood), arousal is another dimension that should be considered. Arousal
refers to the level of excitement that characterizes the dimension. For example, a picture of a
garden elicits feelings of pleasantness (i.e., valence) but also calmness, which is low in arousal.
In contrast, a picture of skydiving elicits feelings of both pleasantness (i.e., valence) and
excitement, which is high in arousal.
Arousal is often measured by having participants rate stimuli (e.g., images) with the SelfAssessment Mankin (SAM; Lang, 1980). Participants rate their arousal level on a 1 to 9 scale,
with a 1 representing calm / unaroused and a 9 representing excitement / aroused. The number
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scale is accompanied by images of a cartoon character depicting various levels of arousal (see
Figure 2) because the pictures allow the scale to be presented to children and those from different
cultures. To gather data about valence, it is often presented concurrently with a similar scale that
has one extreme representing pleasant / happy and the other representing unpleasant / unhappy.
In addition to mood, arousal is another aspect that influences how we perceive our
environment and remember experiences. In general, arousal is known to enhance memory for
details by focusing attention (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Hamann, 2001), such as what occurs
during the weapon-focus effect where eye witnesses focus on the weapon and then remember
fewer details about other objects or people (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). While most research
has used stimuli that are both arousing and valent, a few studies have shown that arousal is not
always needed to enhance memory (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003, LaBar & Phelps, 1998; Ochsner,
2000). This disassociation is believed to occur because valence and arousal rely on different
memory processes. Arousal increases consolidation processes due to the recruitment of the
amygdala while non-arousing stimuli rely more on elaborate encoding processes (for a review,
see Kensinger, 2004).
The interplay of arousal and valence is complex and disputed and there are a few models
that account for both arousal and valence. The cicumplex model (Barrett & Russel, 1998; Posner,
Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Russel, 1980) proposes that arousal (referred to as activation) and
valence are independent dimensions and that the core emotions of each category can be fitted
around the perimeter of a circle at 45 degree increments, resulting in different types of positive
and negative moods. For example, on the one hand, graduate students could be in an elated mood
because they just passed their dissertation proposal. It is likely that they have a high level of
arousal because they are excited about completing a goal and that they also have a high level of
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valence because the successful proposal put them into a good mood. On the other hand, those
same graduate students could also be in a good mood but not be activated (i.e., calm) if they
were relaxing at the spa the day after their defense. A second account of arousal and valence
(Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegan, 1999) proposed that the dimensions are more of a
hierarchy with valence being the primary dimension at the top followed by the arousal dimension
in each valence category. While there is disagreement surrounding how these dimensions are
related, both accounts agree that valence and arousal are separate dimensions.
While arousal has not been the focus in studies examining mood and explicit learning, it
is very relevant to implicit learning because many of the stimuli used in studies, particularly the
negative stimuli, are inherently arousing. Thus, it is possible that arousal, which has not been
measured in earlier studies, could contribute to performance. Because of this, arousal will be
considered in the design of these dissertation experiments. In the next section, I review the few
studies that have investigated mood and implicit processes.
Mood and Implicit Learning
To date there have been very few studies that have examined the relationship between
mood states and implicit learning and, unfortunately, the results of these studies are somewhat
mixed. For instance, there is a discrepancy with the findings for the two studies that examined
mood and the serial reaction time task. On the one hand, Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman (2010) had
participants perform a serial reaction time task after viewing mood inducing pictures and found
no differences between mood groups. On the other hand, Shang, Fu, Dienes, Shao, and Fun
(2013) found that participants in a positive mood, as induced with music, performed better in a
serial reaction time task. The researchers noted the discrepancy between their results and the
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Pretz et al. (2010) study by emphasizing that Pretz et al. (2010) (a) used a more complex
sequence and (b) the mood induction procedure was different in that Pretz et al. (2010) used
images instead of music. The Shang et al. (2013) findings align well with the affect-asinformation hypothesis (Scharz & Clore, 1983), which postulates that positive mood increases
access to prior knowledge in explicit learning tasks.
In a different study, Bertels, Demoulin, Franco, and Destrebecqz (2013) induced mood
aurally through stories while simultaneously presenting participants with shapes in a statistical
learning paradigm. Participants performed a forced-choice recognition test, which is usually
employed in statistical learning tasks, along with a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task
where participants had to identify targets from the exposure phase among distractors as quickly
as possible. While the negative mood group and neutral group (there was no positive mood
group) performed similarly, even after a 20 minute delay, the negative group was more confident
in their decisions (i.e., less likely to report guessing). However, as the authors suggested, it is
possible that the negative group were paying more attention to the stimuli in order to avoid
listening to the negative story.
Another study examined the effect of mood on the detection of covariation, which is a
process that can lead to implicit learning (Braverman, 2005). Participants’ moods were induced
through movie clips and they then viewed faces that were accompanied by verbal (e.g., 80) and
math scores (e.g., 20) on a hypothetical test. Math and verbal scores were chosen because the
researcher believed that neither was related to stereotypes. The participants were instructed to
pay attention to which score was higher. Unbeknownst to the participants, nose size was
correlated with scores (i.e., a higher math score was correlated with a larger nose). Participants
then had to take a test with new faces and guess which score was higher. Participants in the
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negative mood group detected the covariation more often than the positive group, and the effect
remained even after removing the participants who noticed the covariation. Subsequent
experiments found that including a digit string task, thus adding cognitive load, made the effect
less powerful, and increasing motivation via a reward eliminated the differences between the
mood groups. This set of experiments demonstrate that mood affects the detection of covariation,
but that other factors such as motivation and the cognitive demands of the task can also influence
the ability to detect covariation in one’s environment.
Depression could be considered a more long lasting mood state so it makes sense to
examine how depressed individuals perform on implicit learning tasks. There have been a few
studies examining this relationship, but there is again somewhat of a discrepancy with the
findings. Two studies examined mild depression with implicit learning on an artificial grammar
task (Rathus, Reber, Manza, & Kushner, 1994) and a serial reaction time task (Pedersen et al.,
2009) but found no differences compared to healthy controls. However, two other studies found
that those with moderate to severe depression had worse performance on serial reaction time task
compared to controls (Naismith, Hickie, Ward, Scott, & Little, 2006; Naismith et al., 2010). It is
important to mention that the participants in the Naismith et al. (2006) study also performed
worse on neuropsycholgical tests, such as visuomotor speed, so it is possible that general
cognitive deficits were driving performance on the implicit learning measures.
Pretz et al. (2010) have been the only researchers to study the effect of mood (not related
to being clinically depressed) on implicit learning with an artificial grammar paradigm. They
induced mood by having participants view 50 pictures from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) to either induce a positive, negative, or
neutral mood and then memorized 20 letter strings from Reber’s (1967) artificial grammar. They
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were tested with 50 grammatical strings; 7 were from the original set, 19 were consistent with
the grammar, and 24 were non grammatical. Although the authors predicted a positive mood
would facilitate implicit learning, they found the opposite, where negative mood facilitated
grammar learning with participants in the negative mood condition outperforming those is the
positive and neutral condition. The researchers suggested that perhaps a more analytic style of
thinking is more conducive to performing well on implicit learning tasks and pointed out that
implicit learning does not rely on heuristics or schemas (which a positive mood is known to
increase the use of).
In summary, there have only been a handful of studies that examined mood and implicit
learning processes and only one of these studies used an artificial grammar. The two studies
utilizing the serial reaction time paradigm have conflicting findings, with one finding significant
differences (Bertels et al., 2003) and the other no significant differences (Pretz et al., 2010).
Overall, these studies demonstrate that more research needs to be conducted to determine
whether mood influences implicit learning.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine whether mood influences implicit
learning. As described in the previous section, the few studies that have been conducted have
provided no clear consensus as to whether or how mood influences implicit learning. Of
particular interest to the current investigation, only one study has used an artificial grammar
paradigm (Pretz et al., 2010). I think it is important to more thoroughly investigate the
relationship between mood and implicit learning to determine whether people’s mood can have
bearings on how they perceive relationships in their environment and what mood state may be
more beneficial for optimal performance in a setting where it may be crucial to learn patterns in
the environment.
To explore the impact of mood on implicit learning, I employed an artificial grammar
paradigm where mood inducing images were used instead of letters. Therefore, the mood
induction procedure is integral, meaning that the mood state is related to the cognitive task. In
contrast, Pretz et al. (2010) used an incidental mood manipulation procedure, first having
participants view mood pictures and then study strings of letters. An integral mood manipulation
procedure was chosen in the current investigation to simulate how affective objects / stimuli in
one’s environment may influence learning. For example, if a soldier witnessed an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) harm some of his comrades, will he have learned the cues in the
environment to next time pick up on the cues that lead to the IED explosion?
Due to the little research that has been conducted in the area and because the proposed
method differed substantially from Pretz et al. (2010), a pilot study was conducted first. As a
31

preview of those results, the opposite trend as Pretz et al. (2010) was found, in which a positive
mood increased implicit learning on an artificial grammar task. One possibility is that the type of
mood task used (i.e., integral versus incidental) might predict how mood interacts with implicit
learning. However, because it is not yet known what is driving the discrepancy, Experiment 1
attempted to replicate the exact Pretz et al. (2010) experiment as closely as possible by following
the methods from that paper, to see if the same trend is obtained. Therefore, in Experiment 1,
participants viewed pictures, then viewed letters derived from the Reber (1967) study, and then
took a grammar test.
Experiment 2 built upon and improved the pilot experiment. This also served as another
test to examine whether the Pretz et al. findings were an anomaly. The key manipulation in
Experiment 2 was whether the images were positive, neutral, or negative. In addition, arousal
was taken into account and two positive groups were created: positive-high arousal and positivelow arousal. Unlike in the pilot experiment, all images were selected from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997), which is a database of
standardized images that have been used in several mood studies. Examples of positive images
are puppies, ice cream, nature scenes, and depictions of romantic relationships. Examples of
negative images are poverty, animal abuse, and death. Neutral pictures include depictions of
mundane objects such as a trains, satellites, or clocks.
The other manipulation in Experiment 2 was whether the participants received a training
phase or not. The training phase refers to the presentation phase where participants are exposed
to the grammar, which is an essential component of the artificial grammar paradigm. The benefit
of having a condition where participants only complete the test ensures that the grammar is not
explicit enough that people can detect the underlying pattern without a presentation phase.
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Therefore, including a test-only group serves as a control and this method has been employed in
recent implicit learning studies (e.g., Covas-Smith, 2011; Patterson et al., 2011).
Based on studies that have looked at mood and more explicit types of learning (e.g.,
Gasper & Clore, 2002), as well as the pilot study results, it was predicted that a positive mood
would produce higher implicit learning scores. Specifically, according to the affect-asinformation hypothesis, a positive mood encourages relational processing, indicating that
participants in a positive mood would be more likely to process incoming information in relation
to other concepts presented around it. Based on what has been observed in previous studies, it is
possible that the broadening of attention will be beneficial in picking up the regularity of the
grammar. However, a somewhat weaker case could be made for a negative mood making people
better at implicit learning tasks as was demonstrated in the Pretz et al. (2010) study. If this
pattern were observed, it would be because the narrowing of attention might help people learn
the exemplars or chunks better. Because of the larger number of studies showing benefits of
positive mood for making connections, the former outcome is thought to be more likely.
The second goal of this investigation was to examine whether mood would influence the
ability to learn at a categorical level. Similar to Experiment 2, Experiment 3 also presented mood
inducing images with an artificial grammar paradigm; the major difference was that instead of
repeating the same (i.e., identical) pictures, Experiment 3 presented similar, but different pictures
to represent the same ‘letter’. For example, in Experiment 2, the same cute puppy picture was
shown each time to represent a designated ‘letter’ in the sequence. However, in Experiment 3, a
different puppy was shown each time that ‘letter’ is presented in a sequence. This is similar to
the paradigm that Brady and Oliva (2008) employed except that they used a statistical learning
paradigm and their images were not mood inducing. It could be argued that this design resembles
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implicit learning more in real world setting where a particular object / person / situation is not
likely to be exactly the same, but might come from a similar category.
In Experiment 3, it was hypothesized that the positive mood group would also
demonstrate higher overall performance on the implicit learning test. The Brady and Oliva
(2008) study found evidence of people being able to learn rather easily at a categorical level.
While they did not manipulate mood, research looking at mood and explicit learning has found
that relational processing tends to be humans’ default style of processing (e.g., Gasper & Clore,
2002). Therefore, it was speculated that the negative group will perform worse than the other
groups (i.e., the two positive groups and the neutral group), and that the differences might be
more extreme than in Experiment 2 due to the use of different pictures especially relying on
drawing connections between incoming information.
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CHAPTER 4
PILOT EXPERIMENT
Given the small number of studies that have been conducted in the area of implicit
learning and mood, a pilot study was conducted to serve two purposes: 1) to first examine
whether there would be a difference between the mood groups, and 2) to determine whether the
complexity of the grammar would make a difference in participant performance. As a reminder,
although Pretz et al. (2010) used an artificial grammar paradigm, they did the mood induction
separately from the training phase, and the artificial grammar task consisted of letters. This pilot
experiment was different in that the mood inducing pictures followed a finite state diagram; in
other words, the training phase and the mood induction were the same phase of the experiment.
Furthermore, because the Pretz et al. (2010) results do not necessarily line up with the patterns
observed by other studies investigating the affect-as-information hypothesis, there was a need to
replicate their experiment before pursuing it for dissertation work.
Method
Participants
A total of 146 participants were recruited from the subject pool at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. Within the simple grammar condition, 34 participants were randomly
assigned to the positive mood group in the simple grammar condition and 32 to the negative
mood group. Within the complex grammar condition, 42 were randomly assigned to the positive
mood group and 37 to the negative mood group. Participants were issued research credit for their
psychology course. All participants were able to fluently speak and comprehend English.
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Materials
Pictures depicting positive and negative moods were selected from the internet. These
pictures were rated by two individuals (the experimenter and a graduate student) in terms of
positive and negative mood inducement; only pictures that were rated as clearly positive and
clearly negative by both raters were included in those categories – any pictures with a
discrepancy of opinion were not used (see Appendix B for a complete set of the images). The
Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used for the mood manipulation check
(Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS contains 10 positive mood words (e.g., alert) and 10 negative
mood words (e.g., upset) (see Appendix C for a complete set of items). As mentioned previously,
the PANAS is the most widely used mood measure and is found to be highly reliable and valid
(Crawford & Henry, 2004).
The order of the pictures was determined using a finite state diagram. For the simple
condition, the Reber (1967) artificial grammar was used (see Figure 1). For the complex
condition, a modified version of the Reber and Allen (1978) grammar was used (see Figure 2). A
picture was selected to represent each of the nodes (see Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6) in the same
manner that letters were assigned to nodes in the Reber (1967) and Reber and Allen (1978)
studies. The mood image sequence begins when the diagram is entered on the left and ends when
the diagram exits on the right. Therefore, the length of the sequence can vary depending on the
paths that are followed through the diagram. However, the length of each sequence was restricted
to between 4 and 9 nodes. For example, one sequence might be mountain, dessert, mountain, and
old couple if a path was followed along 0120’; another might be baby, dog, dog, baby, dessert,
and old couple if a path was followed along 03420’.
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The sequences that were produced are referred to as the ‘structured set’ (see Appendix D
for a list of the full set). Quasi-random sequences were generated and presented during test.
These sequences are referred to as the ‘unstructured set’. The random sequences were generated
by fixing the beginning and end of the sequences but scrambling the middle portion to
discourage judgments during the recognition test being based on rules learned.
Procedure
After the consent process, participants completed the Positive And Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988) on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) to determine their
baseline mood state. The participants then watched positive or negative picture sequences on a
PowerPoint presentation for 5 seconds per sequence with 1 second pauses between the
sequences. The mood induction and the training phase of the implicit learning task was the same.
In other words, the mood induction procedure was integral, in that the stimuli themselves were
mood inducing. Similar to other implicit learning studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013),
participants were not told to direct their attention or to memorize the stimuli, nor were they given
feedback. However, for ethical reasons, participants in the negative mood group were told that
some of the pictures may upset them and reminded that they can quit the experiment at any time.
The order of the pictures was determined using a finite state algorithm but the same order was
used for every participant in the negative condition and the same order was used for every
participant in the positive mood condition. Twenty sequences were presented 16 times, leading
the presentation phase to be approximately 30 minutes.
After the training phase, participants immediately completed the PANAS again to ensure
that the mood manipulation procedure was effective. They were then informed that the pictures
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they just viewed were following an underlying pattern. They were administered a yes / no
recognition test on paper where they circled ‘yes’ for the picture sequence being structured (i.e.,
consistent with the pattern) and circled ‘no’ for the picture sequence being unstructured (i.e.,
inconsistent with the pattern). The test consisted of a total of 60 sequences: 20 sequences that
were previously presented, 20 sequences that were novel but consistent with the finite-state
grammar, and 20 random sequences (i.e., foils). The order of the sequences was randomized but
was the same order for every participant. After the test, participants were thanked, debriefed, and
given credit for their participation.
Results
PANAS
The positive group had a positive affect score on the PANAS of 31.11 and a negative
affect score of 17.91 after the presentation phase. The negative mood group had a positive affect
score of 27.12 and a negative affect score of 28.50. It is unknown why the negative mood group
retained such a high positive affect score but one possibility is that due to the mere exposure
effect, perhaps viewing the same pictures several times, albeit negative, made people slightly
more positive. However, there were still performance differences between the groups (as noted
below).
Grammar Test
For the simple grammar, the recognition test revealed that overall accuracy was 63.333%.
An independent-samples t – test was performed between the positive and negative mood groups,
with the positive mood group (M = 66.970%, SE = 1.391) outperforming the negative mood
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group (M = 60.016%, SE = 1.711), t (64) = 2.811, p = 0.007. For the complex grammar, the
overall accuracy on the recognition test was 52.350%. An independent t – test performed
between the mood groups revealed that the positive mood group (M = 54.683 %, SE =1.484)
again outperformed the negative mood group (M = 50.181 %, SE = 1.182), t (77) = 2.33, p =
0.022 (see Figure 8).
Discussion
These results demonstrated that there were significant differences between mood groups
in both grammar conditions, which demonstrated that this area of research is a worthwhile
pursuit for dissertation work. However, interestingly, the results were in the opposite direction
than what was observed in the Pretz et al. (2010) study, but they are more consistent with the
affect-as-information hypothesis. As a reminder, unlike the earlier study, the mood induction
process here was integral, so it is possible that this contributed to the current findings being
different than the Pretz et al. (2010) study (which induced mood separate from the learning
phase). One possibility is that because a certain amount of attention is required to implicitly
learn, perhaps the negative images made those in the negative condition not direct less attention
to the patterns. Another possibility is that the unique pictures that were chosen for the pilot was
driving the effect and perhaps this effect would not be observed with standardized images.
Finally, another possibility is that the Pretz et al. (2010) results were an anomaly; this possibly as
well as other factors that may influence implicit learning were explored more in the following
experiments.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
A total of 114 participants were recruited from the subject pool at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas; none of them participated in the pilot experiment. Thirty-eight participants
were in each of the three mood groups: positive, negative, and neutral (this n is similar to the
number of participants that participated in the Pretz et al. (2010) study which had a sample size
of 109). Participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. All participants
were able to fluently speak and comprehend English.
Materials
As in the Pretz et al. (2010) study, pictures from the International Affective Picture
System were used to induce mood. The IAPS is a standardized database of pictures used to
induce mood in a standardized setting. The pictures have been rated for both valence (i.e., mood)
and arousal (i.e., level of excitement). They have been rated on a 9 point scale, with 1
representing unpleasant and 9 representing pleasant for valance and 1 representing calm and 9
representing excited for arousal. Because the Pretz et al. method did not indicate which exact
pictures were used, pictures were chosen that had similar valence ratings. The pictures chosen for
the positive condition have a mean valence rating of 7.59 (SD = 1.49) and an arousal rating of
4.95 (SD = 2.37) on 9 point scale. Unfortunately, the pictures cannot be included in the
appendices due to the fact that I had to sign an agreement with the creators of the database that I
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would not include the pictures in any print format; however, see Appendix F for the IAPS
numbers and image ratings. As a general description, the positive pictures include images such as
people smiling, families, couples, and babies. The negative pictures have a mean valence rating
of 2.39 (SD = 1.51) and arousal rating of 5.60 (SD = 2.20). The negative images depicted themes
such as abuse, accidents, and death. The neutral images have a mean valence rating of 5.07 (SD
= 1.35) and arousal rating of 3.50 (SD = 2.00). The set included images of household items,
people performing mundane activities, and manmade structures such as golfing and crossword
puzzles.
The Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) were used for the mood
manipulation check (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). As noted in the pilot study, the PANAS
contains 10 positive mood words (e.g., alert) and 10 negative mood words (e.g., upset).
Participants rated how they were feeling at the current moment on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not
at all and 5 being extremely).
Although the Pretz et al (2010) study used both an artificial grammar learning task and
the serial reaction time task, the current replication only included the artificial grammar task as it
is most relevant to the current investigation. The artificial grammar task was duplicated as
closely as possible, but the paper did omit some details; these were filled in based on methods
used in other artificial grammar learning studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013). Twenty letter
sequences generated from the Reber (1967) finite-state diagram were used during the
presentation phase. The grammar test included a total of 50 letter sequences with 7 from the
presentation phase, 19 letter sequences that were novel but were not included in the presentation
phase, and 24 non-grammatical letter sequences. See Appendix E for the complete set of
materials that was used in the artificial grammar test.
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Procedure
Experiment 1 was conducted using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT); and after
consenting, participants were asked to view pictures. If they were in the negative mood
condition, they were given a warning that the pictures were graphic and reminded that they could
withdraw from the study at any time. The pictures were automated and appeared on the computer
screen for 5 s with 1.5 s blank screen between pictures, just like the Pretz et al. (2010) study.
Immediately afterward, they completed the PANAS.
Following the PANAS, they began the artificial grammar learning task. Most artificial
grammar studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013) do not instruct participant to direct their attention or
memorize the stimuli; however, because the previous study (Pretz et al., 2010) explicitly
instructed participants to memorize the sequences, participants in the current study were also
asked to do this. Because the Pretz et al. (2010) study did not describe how long the letters were
shown, Experiment 1 used display times similar to other related studies (e.g., Covas-Smith,
2011); specifically, the letter strings were shown for 4 seconds with a 1 second blank screen.
After viewing the sequences of letters, participants were made aware that the sequences
they tried to memorize had an underlying pattern. They were then asked to make grammatical
judgments by answering ‘yes’ with the mouse to sequences they believed were structured (i.e.,
consistent with the pattern) and answering ‘no’ with the mouse for the picture sequence being
unstructured (i.e., inconsistent with the pattern). Participants were then thanked for their time,
debriefed, and assigned credit.
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Design and Analysis
To check whether the mood manipulation procedure was effective, the PANAS scores
were submitted to a between-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). A separate ANOVA was
run for Positive Affect and Negative Affect. Test scores on the grammar test were submitted to a
between-subjects ANOVA with mood group (positive, negative, neutral) as the independent
variable. If the results conform with the original study (Pretz et al., 2010), then the negative
group will outperform both the positive and neutral groups. It was predicted that this trend would
be found because there is no reason to believe that the Pretz et al., (2010) would not replicate.
Results
PANAS
The mean PANAS scores are presented in Figure 10. A between-subjects ANOVA
indicated that the mood induction had a marginally significant effect on Positive Affect scores,
F(2, 111) = 2.763, MSE = 174.588, p = 0.067, η 2 = 0.047, and a significant effect on the
Negative Affect scores, F (2,111) = 63.425, MSE = 1620.500, p < .001, η 2 = 0.533. A Tukey’s
Hones Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc test revealed that the positive and negative group
were statistically significant from each other (p < .001, SE = 1.160) with the negative group
reporting higher Negative Affect scores. The negative group also reported higher Negative
Affect than the neutral group (p < .001, SE = 1.160). However, the positive and neutral groups
were not statistically significant in their reported Negative Affect scores.
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Grammar Test
Percent scores from the grammar test were averaged to create group means for each
mood condition (negative, positive, neutral) and the means are presented in Figure 10 (also see
Figure 11 for a boxplot). All groups scored above chance (i.e., 50%), t (113) = 13.076, p < .001.
The group means were submitted to a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. For all analyses, an
alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical significance. The test indicated that overall,
mood did have a significant effect on grammar test scores F(2, 111) = 3.212, MSE = 0.024, p =
0.044, η 2 = .054. Follow up t-tests were conducted to compare group differences and a Tukey’s
Honest Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc test revealed significant differences only between
the negative group (M = 61.110, SD = 7.289) and the neutral group (M = 58.020 SD = 81.800), p
= 0.036.
Signal detection analysis scores were computed to determine the ability of the
participants to perceive the signals (i.e., sequences) from the background noise for both the
correct items and the consistent items on the grammar test. As a reminder, the correct items are
the sequences that were presented to the participants during the viewing phase and the consistent
items are sequences that were not presented during the viewing phase but are consistent with the
artificial grammar. Hit rate, miss rate, false alarm rate, correction rejection rate, sensitivity (d’),
and criterion(c) were computed and are shown in Tables 1 and 2. All the signal detection
analyses were submitted to a between-subjects ANOVA and revealed that hit rate and miss rate
(which are complimentary values) was significant, (F (2, 111) = 4.051, MS = 0.164, p = 0.020. A
follow up Tukey HSD test indicated that the negative (M = 0.688, SD = 0.169) and neutral group
(M = 0.560, SD = 0.211) were statistically different from each other, p = 0.018. The measure of
sensitivity (d’) was also significant, F (2,111) = 3.548, MS = 0.102, p = 0.032, with negative (M
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= 0.717, SD = 0.557) and neutral group (M = 0.352, SD = 0.352) again being statistically
significant from each other, p = 0.024. There were no other statistical differences for the other
three signal detection measures for consistent items and no differences for all six signal detection
measures for the consistent items (all p >0.05).
Discussion
The PANAS showed that the mood induction was successful. The accuracy data showed
that those in the negative group outperformed those in the positive and neutral group, with the
neutral group performing the worst. The signal detection analysis measure showed that negative
participants had significantly more hits, misses, and sensitivity (d’) for the correct items. There
were no differences for consistent items between mood groups.
This pattern of results for Experiment 1 successfully replicated the trend from the Pretz et
al. (2010) study, although the differences between mood groups were smaller here. In the current
investigation, only the negative and neutral mood groups were significantly different from each
other, but in their study they found all three groups to be significantly different from one another;
however, they only reported their results with a covariate. A final point is that after the
completion of Experiment 1 of this dissertation, it was discovered that the Pretz et al. (2010)
study was based on an unpublished undergraduate thesis; the experiment description in this
thesis was more detailed and revealed that participants saw the letter strings two times and had to
type in the letter strings immediately after seeing them, which is not a typical artificial grammar
learning procedure. Therefore, the method used in those studies encourages people to focus their
attention and that could potentially benefit those negative mood participants who were already
experiencing a narrowing of attention due to the mood induction procedure.
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While these results are in line with Pretz et al. (2010), they are only partially in line with
the affect-as-information hypothesis. As a reminder, the affect-as-information hypothesis posits
that those in a negative mood have a narrower focus of attention and a better memory for details.
In this sense the affect-as-information was supported because the negative group scored higher
on the correct items that were presented during the viewing phase, suggesting that the negative
mood could have improved their memory for the exact letter strings. At this point, it is unclear
why the trends in Pretz et al. (2010) and Experiment 1 contradicted the pilot study. One
possibility is that the results from the former are more driven by arousal than valence. After all,
the positive and negative groups were not statistically different and both had higher levels of
arousal than the neutral group. To examine this more closely, Experiment 2 included two
positive mood groups: one with high arousal images and one with low arousal images.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
A total of 188 participants (47 per mood condition) were recruited from the subject pool
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; none of them participated in the earlier experiments.
Participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. All participants were able to
fluently speak and comprehend English and had normal or corrected vision.
Materials and Procedures
Like the pilot, Experiment 2 had a mood induction phase that also served as the learning
phase. This differed from Experiment 1 where the mood induction was separate. Also, in
Experiment 2 participants were presented and tested with pictures instead of letters. All of the
tasks were completed on a PC using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Mood condition and
training condition were counterbalanced across participants. Additionally, four sets of pictures
were created for each mood condition and these sets were counter-balanced across participants.
The IAPS numbers for all the images used are listed in Appendix H. The participants selected for
the training phase were asked to view picture sequences that were positive-high arousal, positivelow arousal, negative, or neutral in valence for 5 seconds with 1 second pauses between the
sequences. Unlike Experiment 1, participants were not instructed to direct their attention or
memorize the stimuli; they were not given any feedback. However, for ethical reasons,
participants in all the training groups were told that some of the pictures may upset them and
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reminded that they can quit the experiment at any time. It is unlikely that the participants in the
positive and neutral groups would find the pictures upsetting but the warning was given to all
groups in case the warning had a priming effect (No participants requested to quit.).
As in the pilot experiment, the order of the pictures was determined using a finite state
algorithm. Twenty sequences were presented 10 times leading to a presentation phase of
approximately 30 minutes. The sequences were presented several times because increasing
training typically produces better performance that is significantly greater than chance (Patterson
et al., 2013).
After the training phase, participants immediately completed the PANAS to ensure that
the mood manipulation procedure was effective. They were then informed that the pictures they
just viewed were following an underlying pattern and completed a yes / no recognition test on
the computer where they selected ‘yes’ for the picture sequence being structured (i.e., consistent
with the pattern) and ‘no’ for the picture sequence being unstructured (i.e., inconsistent with the
pattern). The test consisted of 60 sequences; 20 that were previously presented, 20 sequences that
were novel but consistent with the finite-state grammar, and 20 random sequences (i.e., foils).
The order of the sequences was random. A separate group of participants were asked to make the
distinction between the structured and unstructured sequences in a similar manner as the training
groups.
Participants then completed the Analysis-Holism Scale (AHS) (Choi, Koo, & Choi,
2007). The AHS was used to examine whether the mood manipulation influences the way people
perceive wholes versus parts. Specifically, the AHS is used to look at individual differences in
regard to analytic versus holistic thinking. It includes 24 questions with a higher score being
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associated with a preference for holistic thinking and lower scores associated with more analytic
thinking. Participants rated statements such as, “Everything in the world is intertwined in a
causal relationship,” on a 7 point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants
responded to each item by typing in the corresponding number for their response on a standard
keyboard. See Appendix G for the full questionnaire. The participants were then debriefed and
given credit for their participation.
Design and Analyses
The primary dependent variable of interest is the percent correct for the recognition test.
The mean scores were submitted to a 4 (mood: positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal,
negative, or neutral) between-subjects ANOVA. Additionally, d’ and bias scores were computed
for training conditions to examine how the mood manipulation impacted the sensitivity and
tendency to respond ‘yes’. It was expected that the results would mirror the pilot with a main
effect of mood, with the positive group performing the best on the test. This would be consistent
with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Specifically, those in a positive mood have a
broadening of attention, allowing them to form more connections. It was also expected that all
the mood groups would perform above chance. With regards to the AHS, it was predicted that
those in a positive mood would score more holistic and those in a negative mood would score
more analytic. This would also be consistent with the affect-as-information hypothesis.

49

Results
PANAS
The baseline mean Positive Affect score was 31.872 (SD = 7.833) and the baseline
Negative Affect score was 15.181 (SD = 5.655). These are in line with normative momentary
ratings of 29.7 (SD = 7.9) Positive Affect and 14.8 (SD = 5.4) Negative Affect as reported by
Watson et al. (1988). The individual PANAS group means for pre and post mood induction are
reported in Table 3. A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare baseline scores to post
mood induction scores. There was a significant decrease in Positive Affect scores from pre to
post mood induction, t(187) = 7.587, SE = .5553, p < 0.001 for all groups. However, there were
no significant differences for the Negative Affect scores.
Grammar Test
Percent scores from the grammar test were averaged to create group means for each
mood condition (negative, neutral, positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal) and the means are
presented in Figure 12 (also see Figure 13 for a boxplot). To determine whether training (i.e., the
viewing phase) increased performance over chance (i.e., 50 %), a t-test was conducted
comparing grammar test scores to chance performance. The t – test indicated that performance
was above chance, t (188) = 16.375, p < .001. To ensure that the pattern was not salient enough
to learn without the presentation phase, a test-only group of participants was examined; as
expected, they did not score above chance, t (75) = -1.359, p =0.178.
As in Experiment 1, the group means were submitted to a one-way between-subjects
ANOVA. For all analyses, an alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical significance.
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The test indicated that overall, mood did not have a significant effect on grammar test scores,
F(3, 184) = 1.251, MSE = 0.013, p = 0.293, η 2= 0.020.
As in Experiment 1, hit rate, miss rate, false alarm rate, correction rejection rate,
sensitivity (d’), and criterion(c) were computed and are shown in Tables 4 and 5. For the correct
items, there were no differences for all six signal detection measures, as revealed by betweensubjects ANOVAs (all p > 0.05). For consistent items, there was a marginal significant
difference for sensitivity (d’) scores, (F(3, 184) = 2.353, MS = 0.754, p = 0.074) with the
positive-high arousal condition having the highest sensitivity, followed by the negative
condition, then positive–low arousal, and the neutral group was the least sensitive.
AHS
Group means were computed for the four subdomains of the Analysis-Holism Scale and
were submitted to a between subjects repeated ANOVA. There was a main effect of AnalysisHolism subdomain, F(3, 184) = 19.058, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.239, indicating that mean scores on
the four different subscales were statistically significant from one another. There was not a
significant main effect of mood, F(3, 184) = 1.018, MSE = 37.902, p = 0.386, ηp2 = 0.989.
Finally, the interaction of AHS subdomains and mood was also not significant, F(9, 184) =
1.623, MSE = 46.612, p = 0.105, ηp2 = 0.026.
Discussion
Experiment 2 investigated the possibility that mood inducing pictures presented in the
artificial grammar paradigm would influence performance. Specifically, it was predicted that a
positive-low arousal mood would result in the best performance which would be consistent with
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the affect-as-information hypothesis. However, this hypothesis was not really supported because
while the positive-low arousal group had the highest performance, the difference was not
significant. This could be due to the long viewing phase making participants less positive about
the experiment. That is, they viewed the same five pictures that were embedded in 20 sequences
that were each presented 10 times. This lengthy process may have led them to find the task to be
boring, which could have reduced their focus on the materials in general. In fact, participants’
Positive Affect score decreased for all mood groups. Based on previous studies (Patterson et al.,
2013), a long viewing phase is necessary to ensure that participants are learning the underlying
pattern; but, as described above, a longer viewing phase can have a potential cost. There were
also no significant mood differences on the AHS. This could be due to the AHS tapping into
beliefs that may not be as transient as mood; thus, the mood induction procedure was not enough
to change a person’s overall cognitive style and way of viewing the world. The significant
difference between the subdomains replicated previous research that found each subdomain
distinct (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007).
To continue exploring different aspects of implicit learning, Experiment 3 investigated
whether mood produces differences in implicit learning when a different picture is used to
represent distinct categories. It was predicted that the positive-low arousal group would
outperform the other groups and the differences would be more salient than in Experiment 2 due
to larger variety of pictures hopefully being more pleasant to look at in the positive mood groups
(i.e., not as repetitive, so therefore not as boring). Also, because a positive mood enhances the
gist or big picture, it was predicted that the design of Experiment 3 would be more beneficial for
the positive-low arousal group, leading to an outcome that would be consistent with the affectas-information hypothesis. In other words, because all groups would hopefully not be as bored,
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the positive-low arousal group would retain the wider focus of attention associated with being in
a positive mood.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants
A total of 200 participants were recruited from the subject pool at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas to place 50 participants per condition. Participants were issued research
credit for their psychology course. All participants were able to fluently speak and comprehend
English and had normal or corrected vision. None of these individuals participated in Experiment
1 or 2.
Materials and Procedure
. The materials and procedure for Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2 except for
two changes. The first change was that there was not a test-only group in Experiment 3 because
the same artificial grammar was used in Experiment 2 and did not yield above chance scores for
the non-training group. The other change was that, instead of always using the same picture to
represent a letter in the diagram (e.g., T for baby), a different picture was shown both during the
presentation phase and during the testing phase. See Figures 14 to 17 for an example from every
mood condition. Due to the IAPS not containing enough pictures, new pictures were found on
the internet by the experimenter and were rated by a different group of participants prior to
Experiment 3 to supplement the picture database. Pictures that had a Cronbach’s alpha reliability
rating of 0.80 and up and mean valence and arousal ratings, similar to the IAPS images used in
Experiment 2, were selected. See Table 6 for valence and arousal ratings.
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Design and Analyses
As in Experiment 2, the primary dependent variable of interest was the percent correct of
the recognition responses made by the participants. The mean scores were submitted to betweensubjects ANOVA (positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal, negative, and neutral).
Additionally, d’ and bias scores were computed for training conditions to examine how the mood
manipulation impacted the sensitivity and tendency to respond ‘yes’. It was expected that there
would be a main effect of mood, with the positive-low arousal group performing the best on the
test. This result would be consistent with the affect-as-information hypothesis with a positive
mood broadening attention, thus leading to forming more relations between the categories. The
positive-high arousal and neutral groups were predicted to have scores significantly different
than the negative mood group.
Results
PANAS
The baseline mean Positive Affect score was 30.525 (SD = 8.091) and the baseline
Negative Affect score was 15.770 (SD = 5.967). These scores were similar to the baseline scores
in Experiment 2 and were also in line with normative momentary ratings of 29.7 (SD = 7.9)
Positive Affect and 14.8 (SD =5.4) Negative Affect as reported by Watson et al. (1988). The
individual PANAS group means for pre and post mood induction are reported in Table 7. A
paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare baseline scores to post mood induction scores.
There was a significant decrease in Positive Affect scores from pre to post mood induction, t
(199) = 15.284, SE = .602, p < 0.001 for all groups. However, there were no significant
differences for the Negative Affect scores.
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Grammar Test
As in Experiment 1 and 2, the group means were submitted to a one-way betweensubjects ANOVA. For all analyses, an alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical
significance. The test indicated that overall, mood did not have a significant effect on grammar
test scores F(3, 196) = 1.907, MSE = 0.078, p = 0.130, η 2= 0.028 (see Figures 18 and 19 for
means and spread). However, an independent t- test was conducted to compare the highest
scoring group (negative) to the lowest (positive-high arousal) and found that the scores were
marginally significantly different, t(98) = 1.953, SE = 0.020, p = 0.054.
As in Experiment 1 and 2, hit rate, miss rate, false alarm rate, correction rejection rate,
sensitivity (d’), and criterion (c) were computed and are shown in Tables 8 and 9. For the correct
and consistent items, there were no differences for all six signal detection measures, as revealed
by between-subjects ANOVAs (all p’s > 0.05).
AHS
As in Experiment 2, group means were computed for the four subdomains of the
Analysis-Holism Scale and were submitted to a between subjects repeated ANOVA. There was a
main effect of Analysis-Holism subdomain, F(3, 196) = 26.181, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.118,
indicating that mean scores on the four different subscales were statistically significant from one
another. There was not a significant main effect of mood, F(3, 196) = 0.868, MSE = 34.035, p =
0.459, ηp2 = 0.989. Finally, the interaction of AHS subdomains and mood was also not
significant, F(3, 196) = 0.389, MSE = 9.789, p = 0.761, ηp2 = 0.006.
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Discussion
Experiment 3 investigated the possibility that mood inducing images that represented a
category would influence implicit learning. It was expected that the same trend of results from
Experiment 2 would be magnified, but this hypothesis was not supported. The negative and
positive-high arousal groups were marginally significant from each other, but no other
differences were observed. In essence, because the negative group was assumed to be high
arousal, the two high arousal groups were the only groups that differed. However, arousal studies
have shown that arousal can be beneficial up until a point but then becomes detrimental (Lupien
et al., 1997; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Therefore, it is possible that the level of arousal in the
negative mood condition was beneficial but the level and / or type of arousal in the positive-high
arousal condition was detrimental.
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CHAPTER 8
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Four experiments were conducted to examine the relationship between mood and implicit
learning. A pilot experiment was used to make sure that this was an area worth pursing
dissertation work. It was found that positive mood participants outperformed negative mood
participants when the mood induction task was also the implicit learning phase. The positive
mood condition performed better with both a simple and complex grammar. However, the results
contradicted the only prior study that had investigated artificial grammar learning and mood
(Pretz et al., 2010).
The goal of Experiment 1 was to replicate the Pretz et al. (2010) study, which showed
that those in a negative mood performed better on an artificial grammar learning task.
Participants saw mood inducing images before being presented with letter sequences to
memorize, and were then given a grammar test. In contrast to the pilot experiment, the
Experiment 1 results replicated the basic trend that was observed by Pretz et al., but the effect
was not as large (as is common in many replication studies). The results support the fact that the
Pretz et al. (2010) findings were not an anomaly and it appears that when participants are given a
separate mood test and then an artificial grammar task, those in a negative mood have a slight
advantage.
Experiment 2 was an expansion of the pilot study. The procedure was very similar except
that the images used came from the IAPS; also, two additional mood groups were added
(positive-high arousal and neutral). The Experiment 2 results showed the same trend as the pilot
experiment, with the positive-low arousal group outperforming the negative mood group, but this
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pattern in Experiment 2 was not statistically significant. It is unclear why the positive-low
arousal group did not score as high as the positive group in the pilot experiment, but perhaps the
mixed arousal pictures in the pilot lead to higher scores. However, the lack of significance could
also be due to type II error or lack of power.
One question that remains is why Experiment 2 produced different results than
Experiment 1. One possibility is that the same pictures being shown repeatedly could make the
stimuli less surprising, which is known to decrease memory performance (e.g., Marchewka et al.,
2016). Another possibility is that the integral nature of the task, as was used in Experiment 2,
impacts implicit learning differently. As a reminder, integral tasks refers to when the stimuli to
be learned or remembered is mood inducting, whereas, when the stimuli are unrelated, it is
referred to as incidental which is more common in mood research (e.g., Blanchette & Richards,
2010) and what was used in Experiment 1 (Experiment 3 was integral but not as integral as
Experiment 2).
Experiment 3 examined the effect of mood on implicit learning when the artificial
grammar task was based on categories. The design of this experiment has the most ecological
validity as it is more common to encounter different instances of mood inducing stimuli in our
environments. The Experiment 3 results showed that all groups learned the underlying grammar;
however, the mood differences were somewhat small or not present. That is, the only groups that
were marginally significant were the negative (high arousal) and positive-high arousal groups.
One possible explanation is that the positive-high arousal group viewed images that were the
most approach motivated, meaning that they may have had the strongest urge to approach an
object (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). As discussed in the introduction, approached
motivated stimuli elicit an action (e.g., a picture of cupcakes making someone want to get ice
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cream), which is known to reduce the breadth of focus (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008) as
opposed to stimuli that are not as approach motivated (e.g., pictures of cute puppies). This is the
first study (to my knowledge) to show that category learning can be achieved with an artificial
grammar learning paradigm; it was demonstrated with a statistical learning paradigm (Brady &
Olivia, 2008) but, as discussed in the introduction, statistical learning is based on a much simpler
algorithm.
Affect-As-Information Hypothesis
Given the pilot experiment results and the numerous studies (for a review, see Clore &
Huntsinger, 2007) supporting the affect-as-information hypothesis, I had predicted for
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 that those in a positive mood would perform better on the artificial
grammar learning test. However, all three experiments produced results that were not consistent
with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Experiment 1 did not necessarily contradict the
hypothesis because it makes predictions pertaining to differences between positive versus
negative mood, and the significant effect in Experiment 1 was driven by differences between the
negative and neutral group. Experiment 2 did not find differences so it is neither supporting nor
aligning to the affect-as-information hypothesis. However, Experiment 3 somewhat conflicts
with the affect-as-information hypothesis with the negative group performing the best and the
positive high arousal group performing the worst.
These findings lead to the question as whether the affect-as-information hypothesis
applies to all of the implicit learning scenarios explored in this dissertation. One possibility is
that, because implicit learning is different than explicit learning, mood does not affect it in the
same way. For instance, it is debated (e.g., Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990) whether artificial
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grammar learning relies more on learning small chunks or learning more broad rules.
Experiments 1 and 3 suggest that implicit learning is more dependent on learning smaller
chunks, thus, giving those in a negative mood an advantage. Therefore, the affect-as-information
hypothesis may not be incorrect, but it might not apply to non-declarative learning processes. In
a similar vein, perhaps mood in general does not have that much bearing on implicit processes
given the null results of Experiment 2 and the small effect sizes in the other experiments. This
would also be in line with those who have posited that implicit learning is more resistant to
individual differences due to being an evolutionary old ability (e.g., Reber, 1993).
The inclusion of arousal could also contribute to the results not being in perfect alignment
with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Many studies only look at valence, and arousal is not
studied as much despite it being important to how events are perceived and to other types of
cognitive processing (e.g., Ochsner, 2000). Some studies have found that arousal is only
beneficial to memory up to a certain point and then it becomes detrimental (Lupien et al., 1997;
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). This is consistent with what was found in Experiment 3 and possibly
Experiment 1.
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CHAPTER 9
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One limitation in these experiments was that the mood induction / viewing phase was
rather long at approximately 30 minutes. Mood inductions are very transient (Westermann et al.,
1996) so it is possible that it wore off in some cases. There is some evidence for this, because
comparisons of the post to pre PANAS for the positive scores showed smaller effects for the
former. This was a trade-off, however, as a longer viewing phase was administered to ensure that
participants could learn the pattern at levels well above chance. Future studies can manipulate
the number of learning trials presented to achieve a better mood / learning balance.
Another possible limitation is attention allocation. Attention is a known factor that affects
implicit learning (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013). In the case of this dissertation, the learning task
was also the mood induction, which made attention to the learning materials doubly critical. It is
possible that certain mood groups could have allocated varying amounts of attention. For
example, perhaps the slightly erotic images in Experiment 3 made participants uncomfortable
and not as likely to focus their attention. Bennion, Ford, Murray, and Kensinger (2013)
recommend using eye gaze as a covariate to account for attention; future studies exploring
implicit learning in relation to mood and arousal could use eye tracking to ensure that all groups
are allocating equal amounts of attention.
Because it remains unclear as to whether a more broad or narrow focus benefits implicit
learning, those processes could be more directly studied with an artificial grammar task that
contains letters that are composed of smaller and different letters, as was employed in the
Kiyokawa et al. (2012) study that examined cultural differences and implicit learning. Of course,
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the mood manipulation would have to be separate as in Experiment 1, which could be another
variable that influences the relationship between mood and implicit learning.
In my opinion, future experiments should continue to investigate the complicated
relationship between mood, arousal, and implicit learning as the experiments in this dissertation
just scratched the surface of this issue. In addition to incorporating factors that could influence
mood (as mentioned above), it would also be useful to examine some of the factors that influence
implicit learning such as transfer. Pictures could be presented for the viewing phase and then
participants could be tested on only letters at test; however, it is possible because the testing
stimuli would not contain mood inducing stimuli, that mood could wear off. To address this
possibility, the targeted mood state could be emphasized with music or stories presented aurally
during the testing phase.
As mentioned previously, attention can influence implicit learning and only a small
amount of attention is required for learning to occur (e.g., Saffran et al., 1997). Because large
amounts of attention are not required for implicit learning, future studies can examine how mood
interacts with divided attention. Although, it should be kept in mind that making a task more
difficult is known to make a positive mood group less positive (e.g., Braverman, 2005 ). In this
case, with a relatively easy and somewhat mundane task of viewing pictures for several minutes,
maybe an additional task such as articulatory suppression would actually make the task more
appealing.
This dissertation may be the first step in having real world implications for those who
work in jobs involving implicit learning in emotional situations. For example, military analysts
often work in high pressure situations where they are watching surveillance feeds with the goal
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to identify suspicious activities. Therefore, an analyst has to be proficient at picking up on the
regularities in their environment so they can detect the anomalies (e.g., an IED hidden under
clothing). Experiment 3 most resembles real life situations because analysts are more likely to
see different objects from the same categories, rather than repetitions of the exact same objects.
The results from Experiment 3 would suggest that a more negative or neutral mood state would
be beneficial to detecting anomalies. This will of course have to be corroborated with further
studies, but if this finding holds up, it will be useful for analysts to know that witnessing
harrowing sights such as victims of war will not impair their ability to perform their job.
As stated earlier, the patterns observed across the three main experiments did not fit
perfectly with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Any, or all, of the possibilities described
above could be explored to gain a better understanding of how mood and arousal influence
implicit learning. These possibilities should be explored so that the complex relationship can be
more fully understood. Once this is achieved, the result can be applied be shared with those who
have to rely on implicit processes at their jobs, such as military analysts.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION
In summary, three experiments, plus a pilot experiment, examined mood and implicit
learning. The mood groups in all four experiments performed at above chance levels on the
grammar tests. Unfortunately, like the previous studies conducted (e.g., Bertels et al., 2013; Pretz
et al., 2010; Shang et al., 2013), the pattern of mood was not clear cut. The affect-as-information
hypothesis was not observed, as there was a slight benefit for those in a negative mood in two of
the experiments. However, the experiments did show that people were able to learn implicitly
when the stimuli were mood inducing. Moreover, people were also able to implicitly learn
categories. This dissertation added to the few studies (Bertels et al., 2013; Braverman, 2005;
Pretz et al., 2010; Rathus et al, 1994; Shang et al., 2013) that have investigated the relationship
between mood and implicit learning. The findings suggest that mood impacts implicit learning
differently than explicit learning. It is recommended that the differences between implicit and
explicit learning, and how both mood and arousal influences both types of learning, should be
continued to be investigated in future research.
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES

Figure 1. Transition diagram adapted from Reber (1967).
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Figure 2. Self-Assessment Manikin adapted from Lang (1980).
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Figure 3. Modified Reber and Allen (1978) state diagram used to generate the complex grammar
in the pilot experiment.
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Figure 4. Positive condition for the simple grammar in the pilot study.
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Figure 5. Negative condition for the simple grammar in pilot study.
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Figure 6. State diagram used to generate the complex pictures sequences for the positive mood
condition in the pilot study.
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Figure 7. State diagram used to generate the complex pictures sequences for the negative mood
condition in the pilot study.
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Figure 8. Mean accuracy scores for the positive and negative mood groups with the simple and
complex grammars in the pilot experiment. The error bars reflect standard error.
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Figure 9. PANAS graph for Experiment 1. PANAS were collected after the mood induction. The
error bars reflect standard error.
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Figure 10. Mean accuracy scores for the different mood groups on the grammar test in
Experiment 1. The error bars reflect standard error.
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Figure 11. Boxplots of the accuracy data for Experiment 1.
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Figure 12. Mean accuracy scores for the different mood groups on the grammar test in
Experiment 2. The error bars reflect standard error.
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Figure 13. Boxplots for the accuracy data in Experiment 2.
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Figure 14. State diagram example for the positive-high arousal condition in Experiment 3.
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Figure 15. State diagram example for the positive-low arousal condition in Experiment 3.

80

Figure 16. State diagram example for the negative condition in Experiment 3.
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Figure 17. State diagram example for the neutral condition in Experiment 3.
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Figure 18. Mean accuracy scores for the different mood groups on the grammar test in
Experiment 3. The error bars reflect standard error.
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Figure 19. Boxplots for the accuracy data in Experiment 3.
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APPENDIX B: PILOT IMAGES
Positive Images

85

Negative Images
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APPENDIX C: PANAS
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
The following 20 items describe the different types of feelings that may be experienced by a
person. For each item, use the 5 point scale to rate how you are CURRENTLY feeling.
Interested
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Excited
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Strong
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Enthusiastic
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Inspired
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Determined
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

2

3

4

Proud
1
Very slightly or not at all
Alert

Attentive
1
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5

Very slightly or not at all

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Scared
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Hostile
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Irritable
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Ashamed
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Nervous
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Jittery
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Afraid
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Distressed
1
Very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

Active
1
Very slightly or not at all
Upset
1
Very slightly or not at all
Guilty
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APPENDIX D: PILOT GRAMMAR
Simple Condition
The letter sequences that were matched to mood inducing images in the simple condition of the
pilot, as well as Experiments 2- 3. The algorithm was derived for the Reber (1967) grammar. The
correct sequences were presented during the training phase. The correct, consistent, and foils
were used during test.
Correct
VXVS
TPTS
VXVPS
TTXVS
VVPXVS
VXXXVPS
VXVPXVS
TPPPPPTS
VVPXXVPS
TTXVPXVS
VXXXXVPS
TTXXXVPS
VVPS
TPPPTS
VVPXXVS
TPTXXVPS
TPTXXXVS
VXXXXVS
TPPTXXVS
VXXXXXVS

Consistent
VXXVS
TPPTS
TTXXVS
VXXXVS
TTXVPS
VXXVPS
TPTXVS
VVPXVPS
TPPTXVS
TTXXVPS
TTXXXVS
TPTXXVS
TPTXVPS
TPPPPTS
VXXVPXVS
TTXXXXVS
TPPPTXVS
TPPTXVPS
VXVPXXVS
VXVPXVPS
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Foils
VTPS
TVXS
TXPPS
VTPXS
VTTTPS
TVXPPS
VTTPXS
TXPPXS
TXPTTPS
VPXPTPS
TVVXPPS
TXPTPXS
VPXPPXS
TVVXPPXS
VTTTTPXS
VPXPTPXS
VTPXPTPS
VPXPTTPS
TVVVXPPS
TXPTTPXS

Complex Condition
Material set for the complex condition in the pilot experiment. The letter sequences below were
matched with the corresponding pictures in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The correct sequences were
presented during the training phase. The correct, consistent, and foils were used during test.
Correct
MTVS
VXVS
MTVTS
MVRXS
VXRXVS
MTTTVS
VXTVRXS
VXTTVTS
MTTTTVTS
VXRXTTVS
VXTVRXMS
MVRXVRXS
VXRXTTTVS
VXVRXTVTS
VXTVRXRXS
VXRXVRXVS
MTTVRXRXS
MTTTTTTVS
VXRXRXRXS
VXVRXTTVS

Consistent
MVTS
VXTVS
VXTVTS
MVRXMS
VXRXMS
VXVRXS
MTVRXS
MVRXVTS
VXTTTVS
MVRXRXS
VXRXRXVS
MTTTTTVS
VXTVRXVS
MVRXRXMS
VXRXVRXS
MTTTTTVTS
VXRXVRXMS
MVRXRXRXS
VXRXTTVTS
MTTTTVRXS
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Foils
MRVS
VRTS
VTRS
MXRVS
MRXRTS
MXXXRVS
MRXTXRS
MRXTRVS
MXXRXRS
VTXXRVS
VTRXRTS
VTXRXRS
VRMRMRS
MXXXXRVS
MXRXTXRVS
MRXTXRXRS
MRXTRXRTS
VTXXRXTRS
VRMRMTRVS
VRMRMTXRS

APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENT 1 GRAMMAR
The letter sequences used in Experiment 1, which were generated by the Reber (1967) state
diagram. Participants were asked to memorize the correct-presented sequences. The correct-test,
consistent, and foils were used at test.
Correct- Presented
VXVS
TPTS
VXVPS
TTXVS
VVPXVS
VXXXVPS
VXVPXVS
TPPPPPTS
VVPXXVPS
TTXVPXVS
VXXXXVPS
TTXXXVPS
VVPS
TPPPTS
VVPXXVS
TPTXXVPS
TPTXXXVS
VXXXXVS
TPPTXXVS
VXXXXXVS

Test - Correct
VXVS
TTXVS
VXVPXVS
TTXVPXVS
VXXXXVPS
TPPPTS
VXXXXVS

Test- Consistent
VXXVS
TPPTS
TTXXVS
VXXXVS
TTXVPS
VXXVPS
TPTXVS
VVPXVPS
TPPTXVS
TTXXVPS
TTXXXVS
TPTXXVS
TPTXVPS
TPPPPTS
VXXVPXVS
TTXXXXVS
TPPPTXVS
TPPTXVPS
VXVPXVPS
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Test - Foils
VTPS
VPXS
TVXS
TVVXS
VTTTPS
TVVVXS
TVXPPS
VPXPPS
TVXPPXS
VPXPTPS
TVVXPPS
TVXPTPS
TXPTPXS
VPXPPXS
VTPXPPS
VTTTTPS
TVVVVVXS
TVVXPPXS
TXPTTTPS
VTTTTTPS
TXPPXPPS
TVVVXPPS
TVVXPTPS
VTTPXPPS

APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENT 1 IAPS RATINGS
IAPS numbers, valence ratings, and arousal ratings for the images used in Experiment 1.
Title

IAPS #

Valence M

Arousal M

Positive Mood Condition
Kitten

1460

8.21 (1.21)

4.31 (2.63)

Puppies

1710

8.34 (1.12)

5.41 (2.34)

Baby

2045

7.87 (1.19)

5.47 (2.34)

Baby

2070

8.17 (1.46)

4.51 (2.74)

Boy

2391

7.11 (1.77)

4.63 (2.43

Mother

2311

7.54 (1.37)

4.42 (2.28)

Couple

2530

7.8 (1.55)

3.99 (2.11)

Wedding

4626

7.6 (1.66)

5.78 (2.42)

Seaside

5210

8.03 (1.09)

4.6 (2.48)

Sea

5825

8.03 (1.18)

5.46 (2.72)

Mountains

5600

7.57 (1.48)

5.19 (2.70)

Mountains

5700

7.61 (1.46)

5.68 (2.33)

Garden

5202

7.25 (1.44)

3.73 (2.22)

Nature

5201

7.06 (1.71)

3.83 (2.49)

Fireworks

5910

7.8 (1.23)

5.59 (2.55)

Castle

7502

7.75 (1.40)

5.91 (2.31)

Money

8501

7.91 (1.66)

6.44 (2.29)

Money

8502

7.51 (1.72)

5.78 (2.49)

HappyTeens

8461

7.22 (1.53)

4.69 (2.20)

Kids

2387

7.12 (1.58)

3.97 (2.18)

92

Seal

1440

8.19 (1.53)

4.61 (2.54)

PolarBears

1441

7.97 (1.28)

3.94 (2.38)

Baby

2071

7.86 (1.32)

5.00 (2.34)

Father

2057

7.81 (1.28)

4.54 (2.41)

Family

2395

7.49 (1.69)

4.19 (2.40)

Kids

2388

7.44 (1.44)

3.77 (2.21)

Romance

4622

7.46 (1.61)

4.11 (2.30)

Couple

2550

7.77 (1.43)

4.68 (2.43)

Romance

4623

7.13 (1.80)

5.44 (2.23)

Romance

4599

7.12 (1.48)

5.69 (1.94)

Courtyard

5779

7.33 (1.42)

3.57 (2.30)

Flowers

5811

7.23 (1.60)

3.30 (2.33)

Fireworks

5480

7.53 (1.63)

5.48 (2.35)

Money

8503

7.02 (1.71)

5.22 (2.59)

Children

2345

7.41 (1.72)

5.42 (2.47)

Boys

2224

7.24 (1.58)

4.85 (2.11)

Beach

5833

8.22 (1.08)

5.71 (2.66)

Nature

5780

7.52 (1.45)

3.75 (2.54)

Mountains

5660

7.27 (1.59)

5.07 (2.62)

Mountains

5631

7.29 (1.34)

3.86 (2.64)

Bunnies

1750

8.28 (1.07)

4.1 (2.31)

Monkeys

1811

7.62 (1.59)

5.12 (2.25)

Porpoise

1920

7.9 (1.48)

4.27 (2.53)

Jaguars

1722

7.04 (2.02)

5.22 (2.49)

Rafters

8400

7.09 (1.52)

6.61 (1.86)
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Skydivers

8185

7.57 (1.52)

7.27 (2.08)

Waterskier

8200

7.54 (1.37)

6.35 (1.98)

Rollercoaster

8492

7.21 (2.26)

7.31 (1.64)

Sunset

5829

7.65 (1.42)

4.68 (2.45)

Sunset

5830

8.00 (1.48)

4.92 (2.65)

Neutral Mood Condition
Chess

2840

4.91 (1.52)

2.43 (1.82)

Woman

2400

4.21 (1.34)

4.2 (2.10)

Crochet

7513

5.45 (1.40)

3.47 (2.02)

Woman

2026

4.82 (0.95)

3.4 (1.84)

Boy

2410

4.62 (1.72)

4.13 (2.29)

Girl

2411

5.07 (0.85)

2.86 (1.84)

Golf

8312

5.37 (1.41)

3.32 (2.06)

Golfer

8311

5.88 (1.67)

3.57 (2.35)

Reading

2377

5.19 (1.31)

3.50 (1.95)

Bakers

2579

5.53 (1.35)

3.85 (2.00)

Chess

2580

5.71 (1.41)

2.79 (1.78)

Sailboat

8211

5.76 (1.89)

5.36 (2.35)

Secretary

2383

4.72 (1.36)

3.41 (1.83)

Shopping

2745.1

5.31 (1.08)

3.26 (1.96)

Farmer

2191

5.30 (1.62)

3.61 (2.14)

Airplane

7632

5.22 (1.69)

4.78 (2.36)

Couple

2396

4.91 (1.05)

3.34 (1.83)

Baskets

7041

4.99 (1.12)

2.60 (1.78)
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Puzzle

7061

5.40 (1.40)

3.66 (1.92)

FireHydrant

7100

5.24 (1.20)

2.89 (1.70)

Stove

7077

5.12 (1.46)

4.61 (2.06)

Tissue

7950

4.94 (1.21)

2.28 (1.81)

AbstractArt

7185

4.97 (0.87)

2.64 (2.04)

Cabinet

7705

4.77 (1.02)

2.65 (1.88)

Chair

7235

4.96 (1.18)

2.83 (2.00)

Outlet

6150

5.08 (1.17)

3.22 (2.02)

Stool

7025

4.63 (1.17)

2.71 (2.20)

Lamp

7175

4.87 (1.00)

1.72 (1.26)

Umbrella

7150

4.72 (1.00)

2.61 (1.76)

FileCabinets

7224

4.45 (1.36)

2.81 (1.94)

Clock

7211

4.81 (1.78)

4.2 (2.40)

Plate

7233

5.09 (1.46)

2.77 (1.92)

IroningBoard

7234

4.23 (1.58)

2.96 (1.90)

Pig

1350

5.25 (1.96)

4.37 (1.76)

DogRace

1505

4.13 (1.66)

4.73 (1.83)

Bees

1390

4.50 (1.56)

5.29 (1.97)

Gannet

1450

6.37 (1.62)

2.83 (1.87

Buffalo

1675

5.24 (1.48)

4.37 (2.15)

Jellyfish

1908

5.28 (1.53)

4.88 (2.15)

Bridge

7546

5.4 (1.13)

3.72 (2.16)

Bridge

7547

5.21 (0.96)

3.18 (2.01)

Stairs

7504

5.67 (1.46)

4.25 (2.27)
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Building

7500

5.33 (1.44)

3.26 (2.18)

Store

7495

5.90 (1.60)

3.82 (2.33)

Building

7491

4.82 (1.03)

2.39 (1.90)

Shipyard

7036

4.88 (1.08)

3.32 (2.04)

Trains

7037

4.81 (1.12)

3.71 (2.08)

Satellite

5471

5.21 (1.18)

3.26 (2.05)

Traffic

7590

4.75 (1.55)

3.80 (2.13)

Freeway

7560

4.47 (1.65)

5.24 (2.03)

Negative Mood Condition
Hospital

2205

1.95 (1.58)

4.53 (2.23)

Funeral

2799

2.42 (1.41)

5.02 (1.99)

Cemetery

9220

2.06 (1.54)

4.00 (2.09)

GrievingFem

2141

2.44 (1.64)

5.00 (2.03)

Baby

2053

2.47 (1.87)

5.25 (2.46)

2345.1

2.26 (1.46)

5.50 (2.43)

StarvingChild

9075

1.66 (1.10)

6.04 (2.40)

Toddler

2095

1.79 (1.18)

5.25 (2.34)

InjuredDog

9184

2.47 (1.52)

5.75 (2.43)

HurtDog

9183

1.69 (1.10)

6.58 (2.12)

InjuredDog

9187

1.81 (1.36)

6.45 (2.30)

SickKitty

9561

2.68 (1.92)

4.79 (2.29)

Garbage

9290

2.88 (1.52)

4.40 (2.11)

Garbage

9291

2.93 (1.19)

4.38 (2.05)

Garbage

9340

2.41 (1.48)

5.16 (2.35)

BlackEye
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Garbage

9295

2.39 (1.30)

5.11 (2.05)

Soldier

9421

2.21 (1.45)

5.04 (2.15)

Soldier

9420

2.31 (1.59)

5.69 (2.28)

Bomb

9424

2.87 (1.62)

5.78 (2.12)

Assault

9427

2.89 (1.47)

5.50 (2.09)

CarAccident

9900

2.46 (1.39)

5.58 (2.13)

CarAccident

9901

2.27 (1.25)

5.70 (2.22)

CarAccident

9908

2.34 (1.49)

6.63 (2.13)

CarAccident

9910

2.06 (1.26)

6.2 (2.16)

Fire

9921

2.04 (1.47)

6.52 (1.94)

Flood

9927

2.71 (1.56)

5.29 (1.91)

Explosion

9940

1.62 (1.20)

7.15 (2.24)

PlaneCrash

9050

2.43 (1.61)

6.36 (1.97)

DrugAddict

2710

2.52 (1.69)

5.46 (2.29)

DrunkDriving

2751

2.67 (1.87)

5.18 (2.39)

Cigarette

9831

2.95 (1.72)

4.61 (2.34)

Needles

9007

2.49 (1.41)

5.03 (2.32)

2900.1

2.56 (1.41)

4.61 (2.07)

Girl

2276

2.67 (1.66)

4.63 (1.93)

KidCry

2301

2.78 (1.38)

4.57 (1.96)

ScaredChild

9041

2.98 (1.58)

4.64 (2.26)

Attack

6563

1.77 (1.23)

6.85 (2.18)

AimedGun

6250

2.83 (1.79)

6.54 (2.61)

AimedGun

6200

2.71 (1.58)

6.21 (2.28)

CryingBoy
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AimedGun

6243

2.33 (1.49)

5.99 (2.23)

Abduction

6312

2.48 (1.52)

6.37 (2.30)

BeatenFem

6315

2.31 (1.69)

6.38 (2.39)

Attack

6360

2.23 (1.73)

6.33 (2.51)

Attack

6530

2.76 (1.86)

6.18 (2.02)

Hospital

3220

2.49 (1.29)

5.52 (1.86)

DyingMan

3230

2.02 (1.30)

5.41 (2.21)

BurnVictim

3215

2.51 (1.32)

5.44 (2.16)

Surgery

3213

2.96 (1.94)

6.82 (2.00)

KKKrally

9810

2.09 (1.78)

6.62 (2.26)

Skinhead

9800

2.04 (1.57)

6.05 (2.71)
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APPENDIX G: AHS
Analytic Holism Scale (AHS)
The next set of questions will ask about your beliefs. Please rate items on a 7 point scale, with 1
= strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree.
Everything in the universe is somehow related to each other.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree

6

7
strongly agree

Nothing is unrelated.
1
2
Strongly disagree

5

6

7
strongly agree

Everything in the world is intertwined in a causal relationship.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree

6

7
strongly agree

3

4

Even a small change in any element of the universe can lead to significant alternations in other
elements.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
Any phenomenon has numerous number of causes, although some of the cause are not known.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
Any phenomenon entails a numerous number of consequences, although some of them may not
be known.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree

6

7
strongly agree

When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to compromise and
embrace everyone's opinions.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
It is more important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right / wrong, when
one's opinions conflict with other's opinions.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
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It is desirable to be in harmony, rather than in discord, with others of different opinions than
one's own.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
Choosing a middle ground in an argument should be avoided.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree

6

7
strongly agree

We should avoid going to extremes
1
2
3
Strongly disagree

6

7
strongly agree

6

7
strongly agree

4

5

Every phenomenon in the world moves in predictable directions.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree

A person who is currently living a successful life will continue to stay successful
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
An individual who is currently honest will stay honest in the future.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree

6

7
strongly agree

If an event is moving toward a certain direction, it will continue to move toward that direction.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
Current situations can change at any time.
1
2
3
Strongly disagree

4

Future events are predictable based on present situations.
1
2
3
4
Strongly disagree

5

6

7
strongly agree

5

6

7
strongly agree

The whole, rather than its parts, should be considered in order to understand a phenomenon.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree
The whole is greater than the sums of its parts.
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6

7
strongly agree

1
2
Strongly disagree

3

4

5

6

7
strongly agree

It is more important to pay attention to the whole context rather than the details.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly disagree

7
strongly agree

It is not possible to understand the parts without considering the whole picture.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly disagree

7
strongly agree

We should consider the situation on a person is faced with, as well as his / her personality, in
order to understand one's behavior.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly disagree
strongly agree
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APPENDIX H: EXPERIMENT 2 IAPS RATINGS
The IAPS title, number, mean valence, and mean arousal for the images used in Experiment 2.
Title

IAPS #

Valence M

Arousal M

Positive-High Arousal
Erotic Couple

4607

7.03 (1.84)

6.34 (2.16)

Erotic Couple

4608

7.07 (1.66)

6.47 (1.96)

Erotic Couple

4660

7.40 (1.36)

6.58 (1.88)

Erotic Couple

4680

7.25 (1.83)

6.02 (2.27)

Waterfall

5260

7.34 (1.74)

5.71 (2.53)

Astronaut

5470

7.35 (1.62)

6.02 (2.26)

Fireworks

5480

7.53 (1.63)

5.48 (2.35)

Sky Divers

5621

7.57 (1.42)

6.99 (1.95)

Wind Surfers

5623

7.19 (1.44)

5.67 (2.32)

Hiker

5629

7.03 (1.55)

6.55 (2.11)

Mountains

5700

7.61 (1.46)

5.68 (2.33)

Beach

5833

8.22 (1.08)

5.71 (2.66)

Turkey

7230

7.38 (1.65)

5.52 (2.32)

Ice Cream

7270

7.53 (1.73)

5.76 (2.21)

Cupcakes

7405

7.38 (1.73)

6.28 (2.16)

Skier

8034

7.06 (1.53)

6.30 (2.16)

Parachute

8163

7.14 (1.61)

6.53 (2.21)

Cliff Divers

8180

7.12 (1.88)

6.59 (2.12)

Roller coaster

8492

7.21 (2.26)

7.31 (1.64)
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Money

8501

7.91 (1.66)

6.44 (2.29)

Positive-Low Arousal
Seal

1440

8.19 (1.53)

4.61 (2.54)

Polar Bear

1441

7.97 (1.28)

3.94 (2.38)

Kitten

1460

8.21 (1.47)

4.31 (2.63)

Bunnies

1750

8.28 (1.07)

4.10 (2.31)

Father

2057

7.81 (1.28)

4.54 (2.41)

Neut baby

2260

8.06 (1.42)

4.26 (2.44)

Mother

2311

7.54 (1.37)

4.42 (2.28)

Baby

2070

7.69 (1.59)

4.02 (2.30)

Kids

2388

7.44 (1.44))

3.77 (2.21)

Couple

2530

7.80 (1.55)

3.99 (2.11)

Couple

2550

7.77 (1.43)

4.68 (2.43)

Baby

2660

7.75 (1.48)

4.44 (2.41)

Romance

4622

7.46 (1.61)

4.11 (2.30)

Seagulls

5831

7.63 (1.15)

4.43 (2.49)

Happy Teen

8461

7.22 (1.53)

4.69 (2.20)

Seaside

5210

8.03 (1.09)

4.60 (2.48)

Sky

5594

7.39 (1.45)

4.15 (2.76)

Mountain

5814

7.15 (1.54)

4.82 (2.40)

Beach

5836

7.25 (1.39)

4.28 (2.41)

Desert

7580

7.51 (1.60)

4.59 (2.72)

Neutral
Pig

1350

5.25(1.96)
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4.37 (1.76)

Bees

1390

4.50 (1.56)

5.29 (1.97)

Jellyfish

1908

5.28 (1.53)

4.88 (2.15)

Man

2002

4.95 (1.36)

3.35 (1.87)

Neut Face

2200

4.79 (1.38)

3.18 (2.17)

Reading

2377

5.19 (1.31)

3.50 (1.95)

Girl

2411

5.10 (0.80)

2.71 (1.74)

Neutral Male

2493

4.82 (1.27)

3.34 (2.10)

Chess

2840

4.91 (1.52)

2.43 (1.82)

Teenager

2870

5.17 (0.94)

2.87 (1.75)

Satellite

5471

5.21 (1.18)

3.26 (2.05)

Mushrooms

5532

5.19 (1.69)

3.79 (2.20)

Outlet

6150

5.08 (1.17)

3.22 (2.02)

Mug

7009

4.93 (1.00)

3.01 (1.97)

Shipyard

7036

4.88 (1.08)

3.32 (2.04)

Lamp

7175

4.87 (1.00)

1.72 (1.26)

Bridge

7547

5.21 (0.96)

3.18 (2.01)

Freeway

7560

4.47 (1.65)

5.24 (2.03)

Rolling Pin

7000

5.25 (1.38)

1.36 (1.10)

Golf

8312

5.37 (1.41)

3.32 (2.06)

Negative
Drug Addict

2717

2.58 (1.32)

5.70 (2.16)

Mutilation

3150

2.26 (1.57)

6.55 (2.20)

Infant

3350

1.88 (1.67)

5.72 (2.23)

Aimed Gun

6230

2.37 (1.57)

7.35 (2.01)

Attack

6550

2.73 (2.38)

7.09 (1.98)
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Attack

6560

2.16 (1.41)

6.53 (2.42)

Suicide

6570

2.19 (1.72)

6.24 (2.16)

Roach On Pizza

7380

2.46 (1.42)

5.88 (2.44)

Starving Child

9075

1.66 (1.10)

6.04 (2.40)

Hurt Dog

9183

1.69 (1.10)

6.58 (2.12)

Injured Dog

9187

1.81 (1.36)

6.45 (2.30)

Vomit

9322

2.24 (1.24)

5.73 (2.28)

Vomit

9325

1.89 (1.23)

3.22 (1.96)

Cat

9571

1.96 (1.50)

5.64 (2.50)

Man on Fire

9635.1

1.90 (1.31)

6.54 (2.27)

KKK rally

9810

2.09 (1.78)

6.62 (2.26)

Car Accident

9900

2.46 (1.39)

5.58 (2.13)

Car Accident

9902

2.33 (1.38)

6.00 (2.15)

Car Accident

9911

2.30 (1.37)

5.76 (2.10)

Fire

9921

2.04 (1.47)

6.52 (1.94)
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APPENDIX I: TABLES
Table 1. Signal detection analysis for correct items on the grammar test in Experiment 1.
Condition
Positive
Neutral
Negative

Hit Rate Miss Rate
0.598
0.560
0.688

0.402
0.440
0.312

CR Rate
0.615
0.566
0.610
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False
Alarm
0.385
0.434
0.390

d’

c

0.559
0.352
0.717

0.025
0.042
-0.055

Table 2. Signal detection analysis for consistent items on the grammar test in Experiment 1.
Condition
Positive
Neutral
Negative

Hit Rate Miss Rate
0.611
0.607
0.634

0.389
0.393
0.366

CR Rate
0.615
0.566
0.610
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False
Alarm
0.385
0.434
0.390

d’

c

0.628
0.475
0.683

-0.0072
-0.020
-0.036

Table 3. Mean and standard deviation PANAS scores for Experiment 2 for pre and post mood
induction.
Measure of

Mood Condition

mood

PANAS positive

Positive-HA

Positive-LA

Neutral

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

31.17

20.15

30.64

23.89

32.94

19.79

32.74

21.70

(8.56) (7.71)

(8.27)

(7.94) (8.37) (7.81) (10.12) (7.87)
PANAS negative 15.17

14.85

Negative

15.11

14.00

16.26

14.02

14.19

16.11

(5.16) (4.78) (6.98)

(4.46)

(5.84)

(3.65) (4.28)

(5.65)
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Table 4. Signal detection analysis for correct items on the grammar test in Experiment 2.
Condition

Hit Rate Miss Rate

PositiveHA
Positive- LA
Neutral
Negative

0.661

0.340

0.658
0.664
0.629

0.342
0.336
0.371

d’

c

0.618

False
Alarm
0.382

0.752

0.033

0.601
0.540
0.600

0.399
0.461
0.403

0.5210
0.460
0.614

-0.01
-0.048
-0.006

CR Rate
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Table 5. Signal detection analysis for the consistent items on the grammar test in Experiment 2.
Condition

Hit Rate

Miss Rate

PositiveHA
Positive- LA
Neutral
Negative

0.611

0.389

0.667
0.620
0.602

0.333
0.380
0.399

d’

c

0.618

False
Alarm
0.382

0.661

0.062

0.601
0.540
0.600

0.411
0.461
0.403

0.508
0.352
0.527

0.006
0.006
0.028

CR Rate
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Table 6. Mean valence and arousal ratings for the images used in Experiment 3.
Condition

Valence M

Arousal M

Positive-HA

6.708 (0.153)

6.196 (0.328)

Positive-LA

6.640 (0.455)

3.345 (0.333)

Neutral

4.585 (0.222)

2.335 (0.293)

Negative

2.131 (0.589)

6.586 (0.868)
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Table 7. Mean and standard deviation PANAS scores for Experiment 3 for pre and post mood
induction.
Measure of

Mood Condition

mood

PANAS positive

Positive-HA

Positive-LA

Neutral

Negative

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

30.84

24.56

32.46

22.92

28.20

18.18

30.60

19.62

(8.10) (10.18) (7.24)

(8.71)

(8.90

(8.50) (7.68)

(7.52)

PANAS negative 15.12

13.82

16.76

13.58

15.68

14.86

15.52

24.16

(5.23)

(4.80)

(6.33)

(4.80)

(6.13)

(4.68) (6.18)

(9.66)
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Table 8. Signal detection analysis for correct items on the grammar test in Experiment 3.
Condition

Hit Rate Miss Rate

Positive-HA
Positive-LA
Neutral
Negative

0.585
0.603
0.641
0.654

0.415
0.397
0.359
0.346

CR Rate
0.481
0.511
0.522
0.453

False
Alarm
0.519
0.489
0.478
0.547
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d’
0.160
0.325
0.440
0.265

c
-0.126
-0.130
-0.130
-0.082

Table 9. Signal detection analysis for consistent items on the grammar test in Experiment 3.
Condition

Hit Rate

Miss Rate CR Rate

Positive-HA
Positive-LA
Neutral
Negative

0.585
0.619
0.605
0.667

0.415
0.381
0.395
0.333

0.481
0.511
0.522
0.453

False
Alarm
0.519
0.489
0.478
0.547
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d’
0.152
0.362
0.345
0.323

c
-0.096
-0.090
-0.097
-0.099
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